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ABSTRACT
The former administration of Donald J. Trump shattered norms governing
the responsibility to relay accurate, truthful information to the public. Whether
regarding trivialities or vital issues of the day, the “Trump Doctrine” unleashed
a global torrent of damaging misinformation and disinformation. This penchant
for falsehood and distortion did not spare U.S. human rights policy. The
administration’s decision to establish a Commission on Unalienable Rights
(COUR) represented a high-water mark in its campaign to subvert international
human rights norms.
After introducing key concepts relating to misinformation and
disinformation, this article reviews the establishment of the COUR and the
substance of its final report. Among other things, the COUR report prioritizes
“unalienable rights” while dismissing other “lesser” or “newer” rights
intended to protect vulnerable groups. Coupled with this hierarchical framing,
the report aspires to freeze the substance of human rights as it was in 1948 and
to invoke state sovereignty as a legitimate shield against international scrutiny
of domestic human rights conditions.
With this background established, the Article explores how the COUR’s
disinformation assault on the common political knowledge shared by democratic
states operated to disrupt shared values while empowering authoritarian and
illiberal actors. More damaging, this section also demonstrates how the
administration compounded this disinformation fissure through its subsequent
advocacy of selective elements of the COUR report for the purpose of
prioritizing “religious liberty” at the expense of other rights, as well as the
United States’ longstanding democratic alliances.
The final section of this Article reasons that restoration of the United States’
vital leadership role in the international community is contingent on repairing
its commitment to the promotion and protection of human rights both at home
and abroad. Despite the Biden administration’s swift, if perfunctory,
repudiation of the COUR project, the Article concludes that an effective and
durable rebuttal of its pernicious and lingering disinformation will demand
more significant policy and educational change.
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INTRODUCTION
Candidate Donald Trump made it clear from the outset that human rights
would play little part in any Trump presidency. Among other things, his
campaign called “for bringing back torture and killing the family members of
terrorists.” 1 Likewise, he belittled international institutions intended to serve as
a restraint on malevolent state behavior. 2 Once in office, Trump promptly
relegated human rights to the backburner, both at home and abroad, to a degree
unseen in recent U.S. history. 3 As but one telling example, Trump’s first
Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson, “rather conspicuously” 4 opted to break with
long-established precedent by failing to show up for the State Department’s
public release of its annual human rights report. 5
As Trump’s term advanced, the administration did precious little to reverse
this dim start. 6 Even the frontal assault on the integrity of U.S. elections through
Russian interference 7—a foreign power tampering with the very foundation of
1. Nahal Toosi, Human Rights Groups Turn Their Sights on Trump’s America, POLITICO
(July 1, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/07/01/human-rights-trump-us-346423.
2. Id.
3. See, e.g., Mark Philip Bradley, Human Rights in the Era of Trump, PERSP. ON HIST. (Jan.
31, 2017), https://www.historians.org/publications-and-directories/perspectives-on-history/janu
ary-2017/human-rights-in-the-era-of-trump; USA: 100 ways Trump has threatened human rights
in first 100 days, AMNESTY INT’L (Apr. 25, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://www.amnesty.org/en/
latest/news/2017/04/usa-100-ways-trump-has-threatened-human-rights-in-first-100-days/; Elliot
Abrams, Does Trump Care About Human Rights?, POLITICO (May 24, 2017), https://www.politi
co.com/magazine/story/2017/05/24/donald-trump-human-rights-foreign-policy-215184/; Sarah B.
Snyder, Is the Trump Administration Abandoning Human Rights?, WASH. POST (July 2, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/made-by-history/wp/2017/07/02/is-the-trump-administra
tion-abandoning-human-rights/.
4. Christian Caryl, Donald Trump’s Foreign Policy Is Already Undercutting Human Rights
Around the World, WASH. POST (Mar. 8, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/democr
acy-post/wp/2017/03/08/donald-trumps-foreign-policy-is-already-undercutting-human-rightsaround-the-world/.
5. Nahal Toosi, Rubio Chides Tillerson Over Absence on Human Rights Report’s Launch,
POLITICO (Mar. 2, 2017), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/03/marco-rubio-rex-tillerson-hu
man-rights-report-state-department-235635. During his confirmation hearing, Tillerson had
already come under “withering fire” for failing to call out human rights abuses in the Philippines,
Saudi Arabia, Russia, and elsewhere. See Tracy Wilkinson, Human rights groups slam Rex
Tillerson, Trump’s pick for secretary of State, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2017), https://www.latimes
.com/politics/la-na-pol-tillerson-human-rights-20170112-story.html.
6. See, e.g., US: Trump’s First Year Sets Back Rights, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Jan. 18, 2018)
https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/01/18/us-trumps-first-year-sets-back-rights#; Gary J. Bass,
Trump’s Cynical Use of Human Rights, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/02/12/opinion/trump-human-rights.html; Trump Administration Civil and Human Rights
Rollbacks, LEADERSHIP CONF. ON CIV. & HUM. RTS., https://civilrights.org/trump-rollbacks/ (last
visited Oct. 11, 2021).
7. S. COMM. ON INTEL., RUSSIAN ACTIVE MEASURES CAMPAIGNS & INTERFERENCE IN THE
2016 U.S. ELECTION, S. REP. NO. 116-290, at 12 (2020).
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American democracy—failed to divert the administration’s attention from
matters it deemed more pressing. 8 As Freedom House damningly summarized
in its 2019 FREEDOM IN THE WORLD report, although prior presidents may have
infringed on the rights of American citizens,
No president in living memory has shown less respect [than Trump] for [the
nation’s] tenets, norms, and principles. Trump has assailed essential institutions
and traditions including the separation of powers, a free press, an independent
judiciary, the impartial delivery of justice, safeguards against corruption, and
most disturbingly, the legitimacy of elections. 9

Where the administration did place value on human rights, 10 it typically
prioritized a stilted and cynical view of “religious liberty” 11 within a vacuum
8. Farah Stockman, What I Learned From a List of Trump Accomplishments, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 11, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/11/opinion/trump-fact-check.html; John
McMurtrie et al., Lest We Forget The Horrors: A Catalog of Trump’s Worst Cruelties, Collusions,
Corruptions, and Crimes, MCSWEENEY’S (Jan. 20, 2021), https://www.mcsweeneys.net/articles/
the-complete-listing-atrocities-1-1056.
9. FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2019: DEMOCRACY IN RETREAT, https://free
domhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2019/democracy-retreat (last visited Oct. 11, 2021).
10. Although the Trump administration claimed credit for combatting trafficking in persons,
observers noted that “[i]n many key ways, the Trump administration’s approach to trafficking in
the United States has made matters worse for the most vulnerable communities.” Jenna Krajeski,
Trump’s Human Trafficking Record Is Fake News, FOREIGN POL’Y (June 20, 2019), https://foreign
policy.com/2019/06/20/trumps-human-trafficking-record-is-fake-news/. See also TRAC REP.,
CHILD SEX TRAFFICKING PROSECUTIONS FALL DURING TRUMP ADMIN. (2020), http://trac.syr
.edu/tracreports/crim/629/ (“The number of prosecutions for child sex trafficking has significantly
declined during the Trump Administration, after climbing steadily during the Obama years.”);
Noah Y. Kim, Graph Showing Rising Human Trafficking Arrests Under Trump Draws on Bogus
Data, POLITIFACT (Aug. 12, 2020), https://www.politifact.com/factchecks/2020/aug/12/viralimage/graph-showing-rising-human-trafficking-arrests-und/ (concluding that “[a] graph shared on
Facebook appear[ing] to show that the number of human trafficking arrests increased dramatically
under President Donald Trump” is false); Coleen Long, AP FACT CHECK: Trump on Human
Trafficking, AP NEWS (Feb. 5, 2019), https://apnews.com/article/north-america-human-trafficking
-united-states-donald-trump-politics-4f0e224371a74c00bcd6dd41dae5584f (demonstrating as
false Trump’s 2019 State of the Union claim that “[h]uman traffickers and sex traffickers take
advantage of the wide open areas between our ports of entry to smuggle thousands of young girls
and women into the United States and to sell them into prostitution and modern-day slavery”).
11. Emily London & Maggie Siddiqi, Religious Liberty Should Do No Harm, CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS, Apr. 11, 2019, at 3 (observing the Trump administration redefined the extent of
religious liberty protections by “establishing a broad license to discriminate,” among other things,
by “prioritiz[ing] religious exemptions over all other rights”). For more context relating to use of
the term “religious liberty,” see, e.g., Jonathan Merritt, How Conservatives Have Changed the
Meaning of ‘Religious Liberty’, WASH. POST (Aug. 2, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/acts-of-faith/wp/2018/08/02/how-conservatives-have-changed-the-meaning-of-religiousliberty/ (“In the hands of the Trump administration, the phrase connotes freedoms and privileges
granted mostly to Christians . . . .”). Marci A. Hamilton, The Hijacking of the Term “Religious
Liberty” for Political Gain, JUSTIA (Aug. 6, 2015), https://verdict.justia.com/2015/08/06/thehijacking-of-the-term-religious-liberty-for-political-gain (observing politicization of “religious
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utterly disconnected from other rights. 12 The Trump administration’s
enumeration of its own accomplishments in this area confirm this approach,
showcasing that it “[s]tood up for religious liberty in the United States and
around the world,” primarily through measures restricting abortion access and
expanding the depth and breadth of religion-based exemptions from generally
applicable law and at the expense of other rights. 13
Alongside this disdain for human rights, Trump’s presidency also shattered
administration norms governing the responsibility to relay accurate, truthful
information. According to United Nations (“UN”) Special Rapporteur David
Kaye, Trump represented the “worst perpetrator of false information” in the
United States. 14 Whether it related to trivialities—like misrepresenting his
inauguration crowd size or Melania Trump’s popularity 15—or vital issues of the
day—such as promoting a false theory that Ukraine framed Russia for meddling
in U.S. elections, 16 urging Americans to just “stay calm. It will go away” when
confronting Covid-19, 17 or peddling a delusional fantasy about a stolen
election 18 and dismissing a deadly insurgency at the U.S. Capitol as “events that
liberty” has “stretched [the term] well beyond its constitutional meaning”); Andrew Silow-Carroll,
No One Owns ‘Religious Liberty’, N.Y. JEWISH WEEK (Dec. 1, 2020), https://jewishweek.times
ofisrael.com/no-one-owns-religious-liberty/ (discussing competing ways liberals and conservatives
invoke “religious liberty”).
12. Robert C. Blitt, Academic Commentary, Trump Administration’s Continued Scorn for
Human Rights, JURIST (July 26, 2018, 9:24 AM), http://jurist.org/forum/2018/07/Blitt-TrumpScorn-human-rights.php.
13. WHITE HOUSE, TRUMP ADMIN. ACCOMPLISHMENTS (2021), https://trumpwhitehouse
.archives.gov/trump-administration-accomplishments/.
14. Aristos Georgiou, Trump Fake News: U.N. Rapporteur Says President Is ‘Worst’ Peddler
of Misinformation in America, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 27, 2018, 8:22 AM), https://www.newsweek
.com/donald-trump-fake-news-un-special-rapporteur-freedom-expression-and-opinion-1272348.
15. In four years, President Trump made 30,573 false or misleading claims, WASH. POST,
updated Jan. 20, 2021, Fact Check #26,438 & #30,569, https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics
/politics/trump-claims-database/?claim=31611.
16. Jane C. Timm, President Donald Trump’s 10 Biggest False Claims in 2019 — and One
That Finally Became True, NBC NEWS (Dec. 31, 2019, 3:30 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/
politics/donald-trump/president-donald-trump-s-10-biggest-false-claims-2019-one-n1101151#an
chor-Claim1Ukraineinterferedinthe2016election.
17. THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, ‘Stay Calm, It Will Go Away:’ Trump Plays Down Coronavirus
Threat, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/video/us/politics/0100000007026
448/trump-coronavirus.html. These instances reflect but a small sample. See also Libby Cathey,
Legacy of lies — how Trump weaponized mistruths during his presidency, ABC NEWS (Jan. 20,
2021), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/legacy-lies-trump-weaponized-mistruths-presidency/story
?id=75335019; Igor Bobic, The First 100 Lies: The Trump Team’s Flurry Of Falsehoods,
HUFFPOST, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/donald-trump-administration-lies-100_n_58ac7a0fe
4b02a1e7dac3ca6 (updated Feb. 28, 2017).
18. Hope Yen, AP Fact Check: Yes, Trump Lost Election Despite What He Says, AP NEWS
(May 6, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/donald-trump-michael-pence-electoral-college-elec
tions-health-2d9bd47a8bd3561682ac46c6b3873a10; Domenico Montanaro, Trump Returns To
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happen when a sacred landslide election victory is . . . viciously stripped
away” 19—the Trump administration embraced a torrent of misinformation and
disinformation that was without precedent. 20
Trump’s interminable penchant for falsehood and misrepresentation did not
give matters pertaining to human rights a bye. 21 This Article explores the
misinformation and disinformation associated with U.S. human rights policy
under the Trump administration by scrutinizing its decision to establish a
Commission on Unalienable Rights (“COUR”). The Commission’s work is
likely to stand as a high-water mark for the Trump administration’s efforts to
subvert international human rights norms through misinformation and
disinformation. The Article’s first section briefly introduces key concepts
relating to misinformation and disinformation. The second part reviews the
establishment of the COUR and the substance of its final report, released in
August 2020. With this background in place, the third and fourth sections
highlight how the Commission and its report represent a skewed vision of human
rights that fails to align with previous U.S. policy and contemporary
international norms, and moreover, has opened an ongoing disinformation
fissure that risks undermining U.S. leadership and its defense of the international
human rights system against other authoritarian and illiberal actors. Despite the
Biden administration’s perfunctory repudiation of the report, this paper
concludes that an effective and durable rebuttal to the COUR initiative is
necessary and will require active policy engagement and educational efforts.
I. ON MISINFORMATION & DISINFORMATION
In discussing the Trump administration’s misinformation and
disinformation efforts surrounding human rights, it is useful to first clarify the
distinction in terms. Misinformation and disinformation are typically
distinguished on the basis of intention. 22 The European Union (“EU”), under its
Campaign Trail With Election Lies and Dark Warnings, NPR (updated June 5, 2021),
https://www.npr.org/2021/06/05/1003282315/silenced-on-facebook-and-twitter-trump-is-set-tospeak-out-again-on-campaign-tra.
19. Brooke Singman, Trump Says Election was ‘Stolen’ and ‘These are the Things and Events
That Happen’ Tells People to ‘Go Home’, FOX NEWS (Jan. 6, 2021), https://www.foxnews.com/
politics/trump-tells-protesters-to-go-home-maintaining-that-the-election-was-stolen-amid-vio
lence-at-the-capitol.
20. Glenn Kessler et al., Trump’s False or Misleading Claims Total 30,573 Over 4 Years,
WASH. POST (Jan. 24, 2021, 3:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/01/24/
trumps-false-or-misleading-claims-total-30573-over-four-years/.
21. Nor did Trump desist in spreading disinformation after vacating the White House. See,
e.g., Maeve Reston, Trump Advances Dangerous Disinformation Campaign as More States Move
to Restrict the Vote, CNN POL. (June 6, 2021), https://www.cnn.com/2021/06/06/politics/trumpelection-lies-north-carolina/index.html.
22. Claire Wardle & Hossein Derakhshan, Information Disorder: Toward an Interdisciplinary
Framework for Research and Policymaking 5 (Council of Eur., Rep. DGI(2017)09, 2017),
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action plan to combat disinformation, equates the latter phenomenon with
“verifiably false or misleading information that is created, presented and
disseminated for economic gain or to intentionally deceive the public, and may
cause public harm.” 23 As the EU plan observes, actors responsible for spreading
disinformation “may be internal . . . or external, including state (or government
sponsored) and non-state actors.” 24 As a further clarification, disinformation
transcends “fake news,” “a term [that] has been appropriated and used
misleadingly by powerful actors to dismiss coverage that is simply found
disagreeable.” 25 Additionally, the term “information manipulation” is
sometimes used to describe the “coordinated use of social or traditional media
to manipulate and influence public debate by deliberately spreading or
amplifying information that is false, misleading, or distorted. . . .” 26
State and non-state actors alike can function as the “origin” or “maker” of
disinformation. 27 These actors in turn distribute disinformation through various
channels that can consist of both witting and unwitting “agents of influence.” 28
The disinformation at issue “can be projected internally against the state’s own

https://rm.coe.int/information-disorder-report-november-2017/1680764666 (distinguishing “misinformation” and “dis-information” from “mal-information” which arises when “genuine
information is shared to cause harm, often by moving information designed to stay private into the
public sphere”).
23. Commission Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the European Council,
the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions
Action Plan Against Disinformation, at 1, JOIN(2018) 36 final (May 12, 2018) [hereinafter Action
Plan Against Disinformation]. See also Manuel Rodriguez, Disinformation Operations Aimed at
(Democratic) Elections in the Context of Public International Law: The Conduct of the Internet
Research Agency During the 2016 US Presidential Election, 47 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 149, 153
(2019) (defining disinformation as “deliberately misleading information that has the function of
misleading someone. It is the deliberate creation and/or sharing of information known to be false.
Therefore, the intent to deceive and the low facticity are central”) (internal quotes omitted).
24. Action Plan Against Disinformation, supra note 23, at 3.
25. Commission Report of the independent High level Group on fake news and online
disinformation: A multi-dimensional approach to disinformation, at 5 (Mar. 12, 2018), https://digi
tal-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/final-report-high-level-expert-group-fake-news-and-online-dis
information.
26. This definition also includes “engaging in deceptive practices like masking or
misrepresenting the provenance or intent of content, and/or intentionally suppressing information.”
Authoritarian Interference Tracker: Methodology, ALL. FOR SECURING DEMOCRACY, https://se
curingdemocracy.gmfus.org/toolbox/authoritarian-interference-tracker/#methodology (last visited
Oct. 11, 2021).
27. Anna Yamaoka-Enkerlin, Disrupting Disinformation: Deepfakes and the Law, 22 NYU J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 725, 734 (2020) (relaying the “Disinformation Disruption Framework”
developed by the DeepTrust Alliance).
28. Scott J. Shackelford et. al., Defending Democracy: Taking Stock of the Global Fight
Against Digital Repression, Disinformation, and Election Insecurity, 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1747, 1759–60 (2020).
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population or externally against the population of another state, or both.” 29 In an
effort to extract desired strategic outcomes, these campaigns aspire to influence
or distort the social discourse, foment internal fissures, sow “confusion and
informational paralysis,” 30 and undermine public faith in and credibility of
institutions, including government and the media. 31 As the EU has concluded,
disinformation “also often supports radical and extremist ideas and activities.” 32
More broadly, permitting the spread of disinformation threatens the very
fabric of democracy “by hampering the ability of citizens to take informed
decisions.” 33 By distorting public opinion, societal debates, and behavior,
disinformation can in turn negatively affect the policy-making process itself. 34
This conclusion is corroborated by a 2018 RAND study, which identified
disinformation as a danger “because it can sow confusion among media
consumers (including in the [general public] and among political leaders) and
lead to policies that have unintended negative implications or that do not address
key issues.” 35
This type of policy manipulation can impact a state’s approach to various
initiatives, including human rights. Disinformation drives what the RAND study
labels “truth decay”—diminishing respect for facts, data, and analysis—
“because it obscures the distinction between opinion and fact and massively
inflates the amount of false information, effectively drowning out facts and
objective analysis . . . .” 36 More troubling still, the potential for this type of
manipulation is amplified by the “pernicious” ability of misinformation “to
continue to influence thinking long after someone initially sees it.” 37 This
persistence, lingering “even after someone has been shown a factual correction

29. Marko Milanovic & Michael N. Schmitt, Cyber Attacks and Cyber (Mis)information
Operations During a Pandemic, 11 J. NAT’L. SEC. L. & POL’Y 247, 266 (2020).
30. THE DISINFORMATION AGE: POLITICS, TECHNOLOGY, AND DISRUPTIVE
COMMUNICATION IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (W. Lance Bennett & Steven Livingston eds.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1st ed. 2021) [hereinafter Bennett & Livingston].
31. Jill I. Goldenziel & Manal Cheema, The New Fighting Words?: How U.S. Law Hampers
the Fight Against Information Warfare, 22 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 81, 83–84 (2019).
32. Commission Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions for
Tackling online disinformation: a European Approach, at 1, COM (2018) 236 final (Apr. 26, 2018).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 2.
35. JENNIFER KAVANAGH & MICHAEL D. RICH, TRUTH DECAY: AN INITIAL EXPLORATION
OF THE DIMINISHING ROLE OF FACTS AND ANALYSIS IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE 124 (RAND
Corporation 2018).
36. Id. at 126.
37. Beth Goldberg, Can “Inoculation” Build Broad-Based Resistance to Misinformation?,
JIGSAW (Mar. 17, 2021), https://medium.com/jigsaw/can-inoculation-build-broad-based-resis
tance-to-misinformation-6c67e517e314.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2021] HUMAN RIGHTS AND DISINFORMATION UNDER THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION

9

of the false claim,” makes the effective refutation of misinformation particularly
challenging. 38
It is important to recognize that while much contemporary media attention
focuses on Russia and China as purveyors of misinformation and disinformation,
the United States has a long record of conducting similar projects abroad. 39
Additionally, in the specific context of human rights, efforts to downplay or
undercut norms or possible violations raise profound challenges for the
international order at large. Misinformation and disinformation targeting human
rights not only challenges the stability of international and regional institutions
intended to either elaborate on such rights or shine light on their abuse; it also
exposes vulnerable groups and individuals to heightened risk while creating an
atmosphere of impunity for those eager to fuel the disinformation as a tactic for
masking malign action. As Human Rights Watch has observed,
[P]urveyors of fake news seek to make facts fungible, and to render the world a
cacophony of competing hyper-partisan narratives where adjudication becomes
meaningless and the only truth flows from supporters of the demagogue. . . .
they seek to break the link between evidence and culpability, making it more
difficult to ensure those accountable pay for their misdeeds. 40

These concerns are rendered manifest in the face of the Trump
administration’s onslaught of misinformation and disinformation directed at
downplaying or deflecting human rights. One can, for example, draw a direct
line from Trump’s distorted messaging regarding detention conditions at the
U.S. border, 41 racial discrimination, 42 the free press, 43 and White supremacy 44

38. Id.
39. Adam Taylor, Before ‘Fake News,’ There was Soviet ‘Disinformation’, WASH. POST (Nov.
26, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/11/26/before-fake-newsthere-was-soviet-disinformation/.
40. Why ‘Fake News’ as Word of the Year is Bad for Human Rights, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Nov.
6, 2017), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/11/06/why-fake-news-word-year-bad-human-rights.
41. Jane Dalton, Trump’s migrant camps on US border ‘undignified and damaging’, says UN
human rights chief, INDEPENDENT (July 8, 2019), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/
americas/us-border-migrant-camp-mexico-trump-un-human-rights-children-a8994831.html.
42. Morgan Chalfant, Trump Dismisses Question on Deaths of Black Americans in Police
Custody, HILL (July 14, 2020), https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/507329-trumpdismisses-question-on-deaths-of-Black-Americans-in-police-custody-; Kevin Liptak & Kristen
Holmes, Trump Calls Black Lives Matter a ‘Symbol of Hate’ as he Digs in on Race, CNN (July 1,
2020), https://edition.cnn.com/2020/07/01/politics/donald-trump-black-lives-matter-confederaterace/index.html.
43. Nick Cumming-Bruce, U.N. Human Rights Chief Condemns Trump’s Attacks on Media,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/30/world/europe/trump-pressunited-nations.html.
44. See, e.g., Adam Serwer, The President’s Pursuit of White Power, ATLANTIC (Jan. 13,
2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/01/trump-embraces-white-supremacy/5
79745/; Sarah McCammon, From Debate Stage, Trump Declines to Denounce White Supremacy,
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to increased vulnerability of targeted groups and their exposure to rights
violations. 45 Trump’s domestic practices of denying the legitimacy of human
rights concerns also align with his international embrace of autocrats around the
globe. Indeed, beyond merely diminishing the status of rights protections 46 and
the rule of law at home, Trump’s misinformation campaign took every
opportunity to lambast traditional U.S. allies 47 and undercut international human
rights institutions, while eagerly shoring up adversaries and minimizing their
own abuses. 48
For example, while the media provided much coverage of Trump’s decision
to withdraw from the UN Human Rights Council on the grounds that it
represented a “hypocritical and self-serving organization that makes a mockery
of human rights,” 49 a lesser-told story reveals the Trump administration’s nearly
total rejection of the legitimacy of that body’s special procedures mandateholders. These independent special rapporteurs and experts report on a range of
human rights issues including arbitrary detention, disability, migrants, racism,
and religion or belief. 50 Most states have extended “standing invitations” to these
procedures. 51 During President Obama’s second term in office, the United States

NPR (Sept. 30, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/09/30/918483794/from-debate-stage-trump-de
clines-to-denounce-white-supremacy.
45. See, e.g., 100 Ways Trump Has Threatened Human Rights – And How We Fought Back,
AMNESTY INT’L, https://www.amnestyusa.org/Trump100Days/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2021).
46. See, e.g., Kate Sosin, Trump has Gutted LGBTQ+ Rights. Could a Biden Presidency Undo
the Damage?, USA TODAY (Oct. 10, 2020), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2020/
10/10/trump-has-gutted-lgbtq-rights-biden-presidency-might-undo-damage/3608929001/; Jacob
Knutson & Orion Rummler, Trump Pushes to Expand Ban Against Anti-Racism Training to
Federal Contractors, AXIOS (updated Sept. 23, 2020), https://www.axios.com/trump-discrimina
tion-training-federal-contractors-63b3515d-9720-4d53-abfd-530262f9f9b8.html.
47. G7 Summit: Donald Trump Lashes out at America’s Key Allies, BBC NEWS (June 11,
2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-44434558; J. Edward Moreno, Trump Insulted
UK’s May, Called Germany’s Merkel ‘Stupid’ in Calls: Report, HILL (June 30, 2019), https://thehill
.com/homenews/administration/505182-trump-insulted-uks-may-called-germanys-merkel-stupidin-calls-report.
48. Liz Williams, Trump Administration Excludes Key Human Rights Issues From Its Reports,
OPENDEMOCRACY (Oct. 28, 2020), https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/openjustice/trump-admin
istration-excludes-key-human-rights-issues-its-reports/ (noting several leading human rights NGOs
criticized significant gaps in U.S. State Department reports on human rights issued under Trump,
“including the reduced reporting on women’s and LGBTI rights and omissions of abuses
perpetrated by non-state actors”).
49. Matthew Lee & Josh Lederman, Trump Administration Pulls US out of UN Human Rights
Council, AP NEWS (June 19, 2018), https://apnews.com/article/united-nations-north-america-aptop-news-international-news-politics-9c5b1005f064474f9a0825ab84a16e91.
50. See U.N. HUM. RTS. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R, THEMATIC MANDATES, https://spinter
net.ohchr.org/ViewAllCountryMandates.aspx?Type=TM&lang=en (last visited Oct. 14, 2021).
51. As of this writing, 127 UN Member States and one non-Member Observer State have
extended a standing invitation to thematic special procedures. See U.N. HUM. RTS. OFF. OF THE
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maintained a reply rate of seventy-one percent to communications from UN
mandate-holders. This rate dropped precipitously to thirty-six percent during the
Trump administration (see table below). 52 This degree of non-cooperation
invites similar action from other governments seeking to distort their own human
rights records and avoid engagement with the international community. The
damage that flows to U.S. leadership from alienating international human rights
reporting mechanisms is plainly summarized in one U.S. official’s take, “It was
hard to lobby the Somali government . . . for human rights when Trump and
Tillerson were saying that human rights weren’t important.” 53
UN SPECIAL PROCEDURES: COMMUNICATIONS FROM MANDATE-HOLDERS AND
U.S. REPLIES, JANUARY 2013–JANUARY 2020
30
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Within this disinformation environment, Trump single-handedly rendered
democratic alliances more tenuous and unsteady in their resolve against grave
ongoing global challenges. At the same time, these actions emboldened
autocrats across the globe. Some regimes eagerly transplanted Trump’s
approach to their own ends, justifying suppression of media outlets 54 and

HIGH COMM’R, STANDING INVITATIONS, https://spinternet.ohchr.org/StandingInvitations.aspx
(last visited Oct. 14, 2021).
52. Data compiled from Jan. 1, 2013, to Jan. 1, 2020, thematic procedures. U.N. HUM. RTS.
OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R, COMMC’N REP. & SEARCH, https://spcommreports.ohchr.org (last
visited Oct. 14, 2021).
53. BOB MENDEZ, U.S. SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN REL., THE COST OF TRUMP’S FOREIGN
POLICY: DAMAGES & CONSEQUENCES FOR U.S. & GLOBAL SECURITY 61 (Oct. 21, 2020),
https://www.foreign.senate.gov/download/2020-sfrc-minority-report_the-cost-of-trumps-foreignpolicy—damage-and-consequences-for-us-and-global-security [hereinafter The Cost of Trump’s
Foreign Policy (2020)].
54. See Caryl, supra note 4. This conduct continued unabated for remainder of Trump’s term
in office. Robin Wright, The Unbelievable Hypocrisy of Trump’s New “Unalienable Rights” Panel,
NEW YORKER (July 9, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/the-unbelievablehypocrisy-of-trumps-new-unalienable-rights-panel [hereinafter Wright (July 2019)].
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undermining government institutions. 55 In Myanmar, for example, one Burmese
security official asserted, “There is no such thing as Rohingya. . . . It is fake
news.” 56 In Syria, President Bashar al-Assad responded to an Amnesty
International report about prisoner deaths by asserting, “we are living in a fakenews era.” 57 Most egregiously, the Trump administration’s approach to human
rights—emphasizing disinformation and rejecting its international relevancy—
fueled “Russia’s general aims of questioning the value of democratic
institutions, and of weakening the international credibility and international
cohesion of the United States and its allies and partners.” 58
To be clear, this critique is not intended as partisan in nature. As Robin
Wright observed, Trump’s attack on human rights “discarded or ignored”
established “American principles and policies shared by both parties—
promoting democracy, defending human rights, containing aggression, and
addressing climate change, migration, and public health . . .” 59 This view is
affirmed by dozens of Republican national security officials who recognized
that:
Donald Trump has aligned himself with dictators and failed to stand up for
American values. Trump has regularly praised the actions of dictators and
human rights abusers. He proclaimed his “love” and “great respect” for North
Korean strongman Kim Jong Un, endorsed “brilliant leader” Xi Jinping’s move
to serve as China’s president for life, repeatedly sided with Vladimir Putin
against our own intelligence community, and pronounced himself a “big fan” of
Turkish president Recep Erdogan despite his crackdown on democracy. 60

55. Steven Erlanger, ‘Fake News,’ Trump’s Obsession, Is Now a Cudgel for Strongmen, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/12/world/europe/trump-fake-newsdictators.html [hereinafter Erlanger (Dec. 2017)].
56. Uri Friedman, The Real-World Consequences of ‘Fake News’, ATLANTIC (Dec. 23, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/12/trump-world-fake-news/548888/.
57. Erlanger (Dec. 2017), supra note 55.
58. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT CENTER SPECIAL REPORT: PILLARS OF
RUSSIA’S DISINFORMATION AND PROPAGANDA ECOSYSTEM 6 (2020), https://www.state.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2020/08/Pillars-of-Russia’s-Disinformation-and-Propaganda-Ecosystem_08-0420.pdf.
59. Robin Wright, A Dubious Pompeo Speech for an Empty Trump Foreign Policy, NEW
YORKER (Aug. 26, 2020), https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/at-the-republicannational-convention-a-vacuous-pompeo-speech-for-an-empty-trump-foreign-policy.
60. Statement by Former Republican National Security Officials, Defending Democracy
Together (Aug. 20, 2020), https://www.defendingdemocracytogether.org/national-security/
(emphasis omitted). These conclusions place President Trump’s record in sharp contrast to the
bipartisan tradition of promoting democracy and human rights. See Letter from U.S. Senators
Marco Rubio, Susan M. Collins, Benjamin L. Cardin, Edward J. Markey, Cory A. Booker, Richard
J. Durbin, Todd Young, Robert Menendez, Cory Gardner, Roger F. Wicker, Patrick Leahy,
Christopher A. Coons, Thom Tillis, Lisa Murkowski, & Jeffrey A. Merkley to President Donald
Trump (May 3, 2017) (recognizing a “longstanding and deep bipartisan Congressional commitment
to advancing freedom around the world, just as Republican and Democratic administrations for
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With an understanding in place concerning the impact of misinformation
and disinformation in the human rights arena, the following sections focus on
the Commission on Unalienable Rights (“COUR”) to demonstrate how far the
Trump administration was prepared to go in using disinformation to upend longstanding consensus around human rights. This Commission, born of the Trump
administration’s loathing of multilateralism and desire to prioritize select rights
at the expense of others, crafted a retrograde narrative for human rights
platformed on misinformation and disinformation. Further, as will be
demonstrated, its final report—and the administration’s selective use of certain
of its findings (effectively generating a second “wave” of misinformation and
disinformation around the report)—exacerbated the threat posed to key human
rights institutions, vulnerable populations, and U.S. relations with traditional
western allies, while emboldening authoritarian and illiberal forces.
II. THE COUR REPORT: CHALLENGE TO COMMON POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE
It is helpful to consider the COUR report through the framework of common
knowledge attacks on democracy. Henry Farrell and Bruce Schneier have argued
that to better understand and mitigate disinformation, it should be framed as an
attack that seeks to manipulate expectations and common understandings shared
by a given state. 61 This approach focuses on two forms of political knowledge,
common and contested. The former relates to knowledge everyone needs to
share for the political system to operate. This “roughly shared
knowledge. . .allows for decentralized political coordination.” 62 In contrast,
contested political knowledge includes information that is contestable. In this
space, people may disagree, 63 but such disagreements do not destabilize the
underlying substance that represents the common knowledge, or what “everyone
‘knows.’” 64 Unlike disputes over contested knowledge, disagreements regarding
common political knowledge pose a danger to democracies inasmuch as they
target foundational knowledge necessary to maintain those societies. 65 These

decades have supported democracy and human rights”); see also Sarah B. Snyder, The Trump
Administration’s Insidious Approach to Human Rights, in INT’L SEC. STUDIES FOREIGN POL’Y
SERIES: AMERICA & THE WORLD—THE EFFECTS OF TRUMP’S PRESIDENCY 1, 2–3 (Diane
Labrosse ed., 2021) (noting President Regan made human rights “one of the four points on the
agenda . . . for all . . . discussions with the Soviet Union”).
61. Harry Farrell & Bruce Schneier, Common-Knowledge Attacks on Democracy (Harv. U.
Berkman Klein Ctr. for Internet & Soc’y, Research Publication No. 2018-7, 2018) [hereinafter
Farrell & Schneier (Oct. 2018)].
62. Id. at 6.
63. Id. at 2 (citing Russian efforts to target systems used to communicate election results in
Ukraine and false content posted to U.S. social media in the leadup to the 2016 election as attacks
on common political knowledge).
64. Id. at 7.
65. Id. at 11.
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attacks tend “to be more aimed at degrading than persuading; that is, at making
democratic debate more difficult rather than attempting to change people’s
minds in a particular direction.” 66
Farrell and Schneier posit political actors and the public share two types of
common political knowledge that are key to the proper functioning of
democracy: (1) the nature of political institutions and commitment to the
democratic process; and (2) common knowledge over the range of actors,
beliefs, and opinions in society. 67 This common political knowledge, while
helpful, does not go far enough in fleshing out key commonalities. For example,
whether by implication 68 or corollary, shared knowledge common across
democratic societies necessarily includes the political obligation to protect and
promote human rights, including the rights of minorities and other vulnerable
populations. 69
Accordingly, much like the attacks described by Farrell and Schneier that
undercut common political knowledge by targeting political institutions, this
Article reasons that information attacks on the source, nature, and function of
human rights similarly undercut a more widely held common expectation that
puts the larger collective of democratic states at risk. Farrell and Schneier
acknowledge this possibility themselves by correctly suggesting that where
people across many societies can generally agree on its broad contours, elements
of common political knowledge have the capacity to transcend borders. 70
Therefore, like attacks on key political institutions such as elections,
disinformation attacks relating to human rights risk damaging the common
political knowledge required for democracy to work and render the community
of democracies vulnerable. 71
As noted below, the danger flowing from this scenario is even more acute
because the human rights framework has traditionally been a common political
priority of democratic states. Where that framework is challenged from within,
as in the case of the COUR report, the common political knowledge of these
states is attenuated, casting doubt on its foundational nature while at the same
time empowering authoritarian and illiberal actors. Borrowing Farrell and
66. Id. at 4.
67. Id. at 8–9.
68. Id. at 11 (although the article in question does not reference the term “human rights”, it is
implicit in concepts like “the democratic process” and the need to prevent “attacks on shared
expectations about the fairness of the political system”).
69. See Larry Diamond, Stan. Univ., Lecture at Hilla University for Humanistic Studies: What
is Democracy? (Jan. 21, 2004), https://diamond-democracy.stanford.edu/speaking/lectures/whatdemocracy (noting democracy consists of four basic elements, including “Protection of the human
rights of all citizens”); U.N., GLOBAL ISSUES: DEMOCRACY, https://www.un.org/en/globalissues/democracy (last visited Oct. 15, 2021) (noting “Democracy provides an environment that
respects human rights and fundamental freedoms. . . .”).
70. Farrell & Schneier (Oct. 2018), supra note 61, at 11.
71. Id. at 11–12.
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Schneier’s words, “such attacks disrupt democracy by degrading citizens’ and
groups’ shared political knowledge . . . fomenting confusion . . . [and] widening
the political debate so that it includes perspectives that enjoy little actual public
support.” 72 By disconnecting its assessment of human rights from the realities
reflected in customary international law, multilateral treaties, and international
and regional human rights institutions, the COUR report destabilizes consensus
and undercuts the resilience of this community’s common political knowledge. 73
This in turn seeds doubt about U.S. leadership and its commitment to human
rights, exposing allied states, human rights institutions and advocates, and
vulnerable minorities and other victims of human rights abuses to emboldened
authoritarian actors who seek to discredit democracy while downplaying their
own human rights violations.
From the outset, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s intention to establish a
“Commission on Unalienable Rights” drew expressions of puzzlement and
concern, at least in part because it appeared to target common political
knowledge. One former Bush administration official wondered what the COUR
was “supposed to do that the [State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human
Rights, and Labor (“DRL”)] doesn’t already do.” 74 More critically still, media
reports linked the Commission’s stated mandate of providing “fresh thinking
about human rights discourse where such discourse has departed from our
nation’s founding principles of natural law and natural rights” 75 to Princeton
72. Id. at 15–16.
73. Id. at 14.
74. Nahal Toosi, State Department to Launch New Human Rights Panel Stressing ‘Natural
Law’, POLITICO (May 30, 2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/05/30/human-rights-statedepartment-1348014; Press Release, Human Rights First, State Commission on Unalienable Rights
Must Focus on Reversing Harm Done by Administration (July 8, 2019), https://www.humanrights
first.org/press-release/state-commission-unalienable-rights-must-focus-reversing-harm-doneadministration (noting the Commission was devised “without the input or awareness of the State
Department’s human rights experts or members of Congress”).
75. Department of State Commission on Unalienable Rights, 84 Fed. Reg. 25109 (May 30,
2019). This purpose was echoed in a draft of the Commission’s charter, however the language
relating to “principles of natural law and natural rights” appears to have been struck from the final
version. Compare Department of State Commission on Unalienable Rights Charter art. 3 (May 10,
2019) (“The Commission provides the Secretary of State informed advice and recommendations
concerning international human rights matters. The Commission provides fresh thinking about
human rights and proposes reforms of human rights discourse where it has departed from our
nation’s founding principles of natural law and natural rights, to which Lincoln called us at
Gettysburg and to which King called us while standing in front of the Lincoln Memorial on the
Mall in Washington, D.C.”), with Department of State Commission on Unalienable Rights Charter
art. 3 (June 26, 2019) (“The Commission provides advice and recommendations on human rights
to the Secretary of State, grounded in our nation’s founding principles and the 1948 Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. The Commission’s charge is not to discover new principles, but to
furnish advice to the Secretary for the promotion of individual liberty, human equality, and
democracy through U.S. foreign policy.”) [hereinafter COUR Charter (June 2019)].
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Professor Robert George, a conservative ideologue. George, a champion of
religious liberty at the expense of other rights, is also the co-founder of the
National Organization for Marriage (“NOW”), 76 an anti-same sex marriage
NGO that has partnered with Kremlin-linked groups 77 to supplant individual
human rights and to oppose what it perceives as “a growing international threat
against the family” stemming from “overreach by international institutions.” 78
Alongside the throwback use of “unalienable” rights, the invocation of
“natural law” and “natural rights” as the impetus for deliberations around
contemporary human rights norms signaled a clear intention to prioritize
conservative values, including the “natural family.” 79 A letter addressed to

76. Conor Finnegan, State Dept. Panel to Redefine Human Rights Based on ‘Natural Law and
Natural Rights’, ABC NEWS (May 31, 2019), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/state-dept-panelredefine-human-rights-based-natural/story?id=63400485. NOW’s current president, Brian Brown,
is also president of the International Organization of the Family (“IOF”), an organization branded
“an anti-LGBT hate group” by the Southern Poverty Law Center. See Hatewatch Staff, Brian
Brown Named President of Anti-LGBT World Congress of Families, S. POVERTY L. CTR. (June 2,
2016), https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2016/06/02/brian-brown-named-president-anti-lgbtworld-congress-families.
77. Rosalind S. Helderman & Tom Hamburger, Guns and Religion: How American
Conservatives Grew Closer to Putin’s Russia, WASH. POST (Apr. 30, 2017), https://www.washing
tonpost.com/politics/how-the-republican-right-found-allies-in-russia/2017/04/30/e2d83ff6-29d311e7-a616-d7c8a68c1a66_story.html (noting that Brown “visited Moscow four times in four years,
including a 2013 trip during which he testified before the Duma as Russia adopted a series of antigay laws”). As part of these burgeoning ties to Russia, Brian Brown is linked to Konstantin
Malofeev, a Russian oligarch closely associated with the Kremlin and Russian Orthodox Church,
who is also the target of U.S., EU, and Canadian sanctions for his support of pro-Russian separatists
in Ukraine’s Donbas region. See Hannah Levintova, The World Congress of Families’ Russian
Network, MOTHER JONES, Feb. 21, 2014, https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/02/worldcongress-families-us-evangelical-russia-family-tree (describing the connection between “NOW”
and Malofeev’s St. Basil the Great Charitable Foundation, the largest Orthodox Charity in Russia);
DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, OFF. OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, SPECIALLY DESIGNATED
NATIONALS AND BLOCKED PERSONS LIST (“SDN LIST”) (2021) (confirming U.S. sanctions in
place against Malofeev); Maksym Bugriy, Hot Issue – Konstantin Malofeev: Fringe Christian
Orthodox Financier of the Donbas Separatists, JAMESTOWN FOUND. (Aug. 8, 2014), https://james
town.org/program/hot-issue-konstantin-malofeev-fringe-christian-orthodox-financier-of-the-don
bas-separatists/ (confirming Canadian and EU sanctions).
78. NAUREEN SHAMEEM, RIGHTS AT RISK: THE OBSERVATORY ON THE UNIVERSALITY OF
RIGHTS TRENDS REPORT 2017, (OURs Working Group et al. eds.) (describing an “unholy alliance”
between “traditionalist actors from Catholic, Evangelical, Mormon, Russian Orthodox, and Muslim
faith backgrounds” who have “found common cause in shared talking points and advocacy efforts
attempting to revert feminist and sexual rights gains at the international level”).
79. See, e.g., Clifford Bob, Why Trump’s New Commission on Unalienable Rights is Likely to
Upset the Human Rights Community, WASH. POST (June 6, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/politics/2019/06/06/this-is-why-trumps-new-commission-unalienable-rights-is-likely-upsethuman-rights-community/; Wright (July 2019), supra note 54 (concluding the Commission’s
Federal Register notice “invoked rights only as ‘God-given’ [and] implicitly challenged man-made
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Secretary Pompeo by a group of democratic senators reiterated the “deep
concern” over the flawed process and intent surrounding the COUR. The
senators cautioned that the term “natural law” was “sometimes used in
association with discrimination against marginalized populations” and that State
Department’s list of COUR commissioners—“individuals known to support
discriminatory policies toward LGBTQ people, hold views hostile to women’s
rights, and/or support positions at odds with U.S. treaty obligations”—could not
satisfy the requirement for diversity of views under the Federal Advisory
Committee Act (“FACA”). 80 Further clouding the COUR’s start, several human
rights groups sued Secretary Pompeo under FACA, arguing the State
Department failed to comply with its requirements concerning the
Commission’s chartering and the public release of its records. 81
Pompeo’s opening remarks at the COUR’s official inauguration only
reinforced these initial concerns, putting a bizarre array of “the most basic of
questions” to the Commission members and in the process betraying his
parochial insistence that any rights had to be God-given:
• What does it mean to say or claim that something is, in fact, a human right?
• How do we know or how do we determine whether that claim that this or that
is a human right, is it true, and therefore, ought it to be honored?
• How can there be human rights, rights we possess not as privileges we are
granted or even earn, but simply by virtue of our humanity belong to us?
• Is it, in fact, true, as our Declaration of Independence asserts, that as human
beings, we – all of us, every member of our human family – are endowed by
our creator with certain unalienable rights? 82

laws as well as decisions by the Supreme Court on abortion, homosexuality, and same-sex
marriage”).
80. Letter from U.S. Senators Robert Menendez, Patrick Leahy, Richard J. Durbin, Jeanne
Shaheen, & Christopher Coons to Sec’y of State Michael R. Pompeo (June 12, 2019) (warning the
Commission “must not serve as a platform to further erode U.S. leadership and undercut U.S.
interests”); see also Letter from Jamie Raskin Chair, House Subcomm. on Civil Rights & Civil
Liberties, Comm. on Oversight & Reform, & Joaquin Castro, Chair, Subcomm. on Oversight &
Investigations, Comm. on Foreign Affairs, to Mary Ann Glendon, Ambassador & Chair, Comm’n
on Unalienable Rights, & Dr. Peter Berkowitz, Exec. Sec’y, Comm’n on Unalienable Rights (June
9, 2020) (expressing “serious misgivings about the direction taken by the State Department’s new
Commission on Unalienable Rights” and requesting the production of various documents and
information as well as a briefing by the COUR commissioners before a House subcommittee).
81. Complaint at 4–5, 24, 35, Robert F. Kennedy Ctr. for Just. & Hum. Rts. v. Pompeo, No.
1:20-cv-02002 (S.D.N.Y Mar. 6, 2020), dismissed, No. 1:20-cv-02002(JGK) (S.D.N.Y Feb. 17,
2021) (suit dismissed without prejudice as moot).
82. Michael R. Pompeo, U.S. Sec’y of State, Remarks to the Press (July 8, 2019) (transcript
available at https://2017-2021.state.gov/secretary-of-state-michael-r-pompeo-remarks-to-the-press
-3/index.html) [hereinafter Pompeo Remarks (July 2019)]. Secretary Pompeo’s last question to the
Commission suggested the COUR also take on the task of proving God’s existence.
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Although a newly revised COUR charter acknowledged the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”) as a touchpoint for the Commission’s
inquiry, it failed to reference or incorporate the significant body of law that had
emerged in the seventy years since the UDHR, in the form of binding custom
and international human rights treaties, including several ratified by the United
States. Thus, from the outset, the COUR would undertake its task of “providing
advice to the Secretary regarding human rights in international settings” against
an artificially constrained framework that effectively denied the robust evolutive
nature of the international human rights system and remained anchored to a
limited notion of “unalienable” rights derived from the “nation’s founding
principles.” 83
Secretary Pompeo did not attempt to conceal the rationale for this warped
departure point:
[W]hen politicians and bureaucrats create new rights, they blur the distinction
between unalienable rights and ad hoc rights granted by governments.
Unalienable rights are by nature universal. Not everything good, or everything
granted by a government, can be a universal right. Loose talk of “rights”
unmoors us from the principles of liberal democracy. 84

To further justify the intention that the COUR bifurcate worthy unalienable
rights rooted in the U.S. Declaration of Independence from less worthy so-called
“ad hoc” rights, Secretary Pompeo misleadingly invoked Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr.’s iconic I Have a Dream 85 Speech as illustrative of “fidelity to our
nation’s founding principles.” 86 More accurately, Dr. King’s speech recognized
social and economic rights—what Pompeo disparagingly labels “new rights”
created by “politicians and bureaucrats”—as a requisite component for fulfilling
the Framers’ promise of “unalienable rights,” 87 and alongside this, also
83. COUR Charter (June 2019), supra note 75, at ¶ 3.
84. COUR Charter (June 2019), supra note 75; Michael R. Pompeo, Unalienable Rights and
U.S. Foreign Policy: The Founders’ Principles Can Help Revitalize Liberal Democracy Worldwide, WALL ST. J. (July 7, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/unalienable-rights-and-u-s-foreignpolicy-11562526448.
85. Id.; see also Pompeo Remarks (July 2019), supra note 82.
86. Pompeo Remarks (July 2019), supra note 82.
87. Among other things, King’s historic address speaks to the crippling inequality derived
from economic discrimination and segregation, observing that Black people were relegated to
“liv[ing] on a lonely island of poverty in the midst of a vast ocean of material prosperity,” and that
the “true meaning” of the creed “all men are created equal” entailed the removal of economic
barriers fueled by discrimination. Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream (Aug. 28, 1963), in NPR
(Jan. 18, 2010), https://www.npr.org/2010/01/18/122701268/i-have-a-dream-speech-in-its-entirety
[hereinafter King, I Have a Dream Speech]. Others have recognized this connection, see, e.g.,
Douglas E. Thompson, Economic equality: Martin Luther King Jr.’s Other Dream, WASH. POST
(Jan. 21, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/01/21/economic-equality-martinluther-king-jrs-other-dream/; Michael K Honey, Martin Luther King’s forgotten legacy? His fight
for economic justice, GUARDIAN (Apr. 3, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree
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articulated a sweeping right to freedom as necessarily belonging to “all of God’s
children.” 88
As the newly minted Commission members and a revised COUR charter
took shape, a large coalition of foreign policy, human rights, civil liberties, social
justice and faith leaders formally urged the secretary of state to “disband [the]
body [and] focus [his] personal attention on the significant challenges currently
facing the protection of human rights globally.” 89 In brief, the chief concerns
raised by this group remained focused on the Trump administration’s decision
to establish the COUR without the DRL’s input, its failure to “‘be fairly balanced
in its membership,’” 90 and its disregard for the prevailing international
consensus “that all rights are universal and equal.” 91
Already before starting its work, therefore, the COUR’s mandate was
platformed on disinformation and information manipulation that undercut
conventional common political knowledge across western democracies and
beyond. These seeds of untruth planted by Secretary Pompeo—constricting
consideration of international human rights law against a stilted backdrop of
natural law/natural rights and stipulating a division between unalienable and
lesser “ad hoc” rights despite the international consensus view that “all human
rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated” 92—
nurtured an illusory realm utterly detached from the contemporary international
legal framework. It is within this artifice that the COUR would purport to
provide “advice and recommendations on human rights.” 93 Further, given their
backgrounds signaling a heavy emphasis on religious freedom, the
commissioners themselves ultimately would reinforce this distorted and

/2018/apr/03/martin-luther-king-50th-anniversary-; Martin Luther King Jr. and the Fight For
Racial and Economic Justice, UAW (Jan. 21, 2019), https://uaw.org/martin-luther-king-jr-fightracial-economic-justice/.
88. King, I Have a Dream Speech, supra note 87 (emphasis added). This language echoes the
inclusive departure point premise of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: “All human beings
are born free and equal in dignity and rights.” G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, art. 1 (Dec. 10, 1948) (emphasis added) [hereinafter UDHR].
89. Letter to Sec’y of State Michael R. Pompeo (July 23, 2019) (undersigned by “U.S. foreign
policy, human rights, civil liberties, social justice, and faith leaders, experts, scholars, and
organizations”) [hereinafter Letter to Pompeo (July 2019)].
90. According to the coalition letter, many of the commissioners maintained “extreme
positions opposing LGBTQI and reproductive rights, and some have taken public stances in support
of indefensible human rights violations. The Commission’s chair, [Mary Anne Glendon], has stated
that marriage equality undercuts the welfare of children.” Id.
91. Id.
92. World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, § I
¶ 5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (June 25, 1993), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Professional
Interest/vienna.pdf.
93. COUR Charter (June 2019), supra note 75.
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restrictive vision of human rights. As the coalition letter to Secretary Pompeo
summarized:
Almost all of the Commission’s members have focused their professional lives
and scholarship on questions of religious freedom, and some have sought to
elevate it above other fundamental rights. . . . No Commissioner focuses nearly
as exclusively on any other issue of pressing concern contained with the UDHR,
including the right to asylum, the right to be free from torture, the right to equal
protection against any discrimination, or any of the UDHR’s enumerated
economic, social, and cultural rights, among other topics. 94

Between 2019–2020, the COUR held a handful of public consultations
leading up to publication of a draft report in July 2020. 95 Following a two-week
public comment period, the COUR released its final report on August 26, 2020.
This report reflected only minimal changes because, in the COUR’s view, the
public comment period “restated perspectives” already taken into account. 96 The
absence of any notable modifications meant that the COUR’s final work product
embedded many of Secretary Pompeo’s original omissions and distortions.
Predictably, an array of human rights organizations aligned to reject the report
as undermining U.S. commitments to human rights. 97 At the same time,
conservative, religious, and family-rights groups—as well as the Commission’s
own members—applauded the COUR for its work. 98
94. Letter to Pompeo (July 2019), supra note 89.
95. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, DRAFT REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON UNALIENABLE
RIGHTS (2020), https://2017-2021.state.gov/draft-report-of-the-commission-on-unalienable-rights
/index.html. In response to the two-week public comment period, the author submitted a standalone
letter, Robert C. Blitt, To Russia, With Love, JURIST (July 30, 2020), https://www.jurist.org/com
mentary/2020/07/robert-blitt-to-russia-with-love, and co-signed a coalition letter released by
Human Rights First, Press Release, Letter to Mary Ann Glendon, Chairperson, Commission on
Unalienable Rights (July 30, 2020) [hereinafter Letter to Glendon (July 2020)].
96. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON UNALIENABLE RIGHTS
(2021), https://2017-2021.state.gov/report-of-the-commission-on-unalienable-rights/index.html
[hereinafter REPORT OF THE COUR]. On January 5, 2021, Peter Berkowitz sent an action
memorandum to then Secretary Pompeo recommending that the Commission be terminated
because its work was complete. Pompeo approved this action memorandum, setting termination of
the Commission effective January 14, 2021. Declaration in Support of Motion at 3, Robert F.
Kennedy Ctr. for Justice & Hum. Rts. v. Pompeo, No. 1:20-cv-02002 (S.D.N.Y Mar. 6, 2020),
dismissed, No. 1:20-cv-02002(JGK) (S.D.N.Y Feb. 17, 2021) (suit dismissed without prejudice as
moot).
97. Letter to Glendon (July 2020), supra note 95.
98. See, e.g., Commission on Unalienable Rights Did a Good, not Great, Job, RUTH INST.
(Aug. 17, 2020), http://www.ruthinstitute.org/ruth-speaks-out/ruth-inst-commission-on-unalien
able-rights-did-a-good-not-great-job (“We applaud the Commission for an excellent exposition of
the origins of human rights. But we wish it had gone further and issued a strong defense of the
natural rights that are currently under assault.”); Emilie Kao & Brett Schaefer, Pompeo’s Panel
Offers Needed Clarity, Guidance on Human Rights, DAILY SIGNAL (July 20, 2020),
https://www.dailysignal.com/2020/07/20/pompeos-panel-offers-needed-clarity-guidance-on-

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2021] HUMAN RIGHTS AND DISINFORMATION UNDER THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION

21

Several of the most problematic COUR distortions merit attention. First,
although its final report observes that human rights are “indivisible and
interdependent,” its substance is dedicated to undercutting this premise and
entrenching a rights hierarchy with property and religious liberty at its apex. 99
This approach in turn dismisses other lesser rights or new rights that operate to
protect vulnerable groups. One might presume that such a dismissal includes
rights extended to the disabled and elderly—two specific classes omitted from
enumerated protection under the UDHR. But more explicitly, the Commission
makes plain that its framing denies the legitimacy of LGBTQ equality and nondiscrimination as a rights issue, instead characterizing the issue as a “divisive
social and political controvers[y]” 100—in the COUR’s own words, a
“contestable political preference” cloaked “in the mantle of human rights.” 101
Taking this dim view does serious damage to the UDHR’s article 1
grundnorm establishing that “[a]ll human beings are born free and equal in
dignity and rights.” 102 It also gravely ignores the UDHR’s forward-looking
orientation to ensure for everyone “the rights and freedoms set forth in [the]
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or
other status.” 103 This intentional phrasing demonstrates that the enumerated
grounds envisioned in 1948 were intended as illustrative and flexible, rather than
narrow and restricted. 104 The Commission further diminishes this foundational
truth by failing to observe that this same spirit has carried over to all major
human-rights/ (both authors affiliated with the Heritage Foundation); E. Douglas Clark, Protecting
Sacred Rights and Rejecting Pseudo Rights: Secretary Pompeo and the Draft Report of the
Commission on Unalienable Rights, INT’L FAMILY NEWS (July 23, 2020), https://ifamnews.com/
en/protecting-sacred-rights-and-rejecting-pseudo-rights-secretary-pompeo-and-the-draft-report-of
-the-commission-on-unalienable-rights (“applaud[ing] the leadership of Secretary Pompeo and the
work of the Commission he established—a landmark initiative as bold and timely as was the
creation of the Declaration of Independence itself”); Teleforum, The Commission on Unalienable
Rights Report, Human Rights, and U.S. Foreign Policy, FEDERALIST SOC’Y (July 31, 2020),
https://fedsoc.org/events/the-commission-on-unalienable-rights-report-human-rights-and-u-sforeign-policy; Peter Berkowitz & Mary Ann Glendon, Commission on Unalienable Rights:
Lessons Learned, REALCLEARWORLD (Jan. 7, 2021), https://www.realclearworld.com/arti
cles/2021/01/07/commission_on_unalienable_rights_lessons_learned_655765.html [hereinafter
Berkowitz & Glendon (Jan. 2021)].
99. REPORT OF THE COUR, supra note 96, at 13, 37.
100. UDHR, supra note 88, art. 25; REPORT OF THE COUR, supra note 96, at 24.
101. REPORT OF THE COUR, supra note 96, at 25.
102. UDHR, supra note 88, art. 1. The Commission so buries this fundamental norm, that one
must reach the second to last page of its report before it is clearly acknowledged. REPORT OF THE
COUR, supra note 96, at 56.
103. UDHR, supra note 88, art. 2 (emphasis added).
104. Robert C. Blitt, Leveraging Regional Human Rights Mechanisms Against Universal
Human Rights: The OIC Independent Permanent Human Rights Commission Study on Sexual
Orientation, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. ONLINE, no. 1, 2018, at 1, 33 (internal quotes omitted).
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international human rights instruments—including those ratified by the United
States 105—and reflects a longstanding practice to ensure provisions governing
non-discrimination close “with the words ‘other status.’” 106
Second, the COUR justifiably raises concerns over the proliferation of “soft
law” norms that are untethered from “formally binding legal norms in ratified
treaties.” 107 The Commission observes that this practice runs the risk of
damaging the credibility of the human rights framework. This norm proliferation
critique is by no means a new one. 108 But in pointing it out, the COUR neglects
the much larger damage its analysis inflicts upon the human rights system. The
Commission attacks the process of norm creation, asserting that it “frequently
privilege[s] the participation of self-appointed elites.” 109 This attack on elites—
reiterated by the COUR elsewhere 110—neglects the fact that the United States’
own “elites” have played a central role in these processes. But more profoundly
disturbing, it also taps into the narrative constructed by an assortment of radicalright parties espousing nationalist agendas that “attack elite ‘deep state’ and
‘globalist’ institutions with conspiracy theories, and widen social divisions with
racism, religious hatred, alarming stories about migrants, and other exclusionary
discourses.” 111 This “rejection of the elites” mantra has been identified as “a root
cause of the crisis of information manipulation,” 112 and, perhaps not
105. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
art. 2, ¶ 1 (Mar. 23, 1976) (“Each State Party . . . undertakes to respect and to ensure to all
individuals . . . the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such
as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property,
birth or other status.”) (emphasis added).
106. U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Born Free and Equal: Sexual Orientation and
Gender Identity in International Human Rights Law, at 40, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/12/06 (Aug. 2012).
More generally, the law of treaties recognizes that where “a treaty is open to two interpretations
one of which does and the other does not enable the treaty to have appropriate effects, good faith
and the objects and purposes of the treaty demand that the former interpretation should be adopted.”
Report of the Commission to the General Assembly: Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with
Commentaries, at 219 [1996] 2 Y.B. Int’l Law Comm’n. 187, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.l. In the International Law Commission’s view, when properly limited
and applied, this approach “does not call for an ‘extensive’ or ‘liberal’ interpretation in the sense
of an interpretation going beyond what is expressed or necessarily to be implied in the terms of the
treaty.” Id.
107. REPORT OF THE COUR, supra note 96, at 41.
108. See generally, Robert C. Blitt, Who Will Watch the Watchdogs? Human Rights
Nongovernmental Organizations and the Case for Regulation, 10 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 261
(2004).
109. REPORT OF THE COUR, supra note 96, at 41.
110. For example, the COUR report attacks international human rights institutions as “rife with
serious flaws,” because of the “enormous discretion in the professional elites who staff their
permanent bureaucracies.” REPORT OF THE COUR, supra note 96, at 48.
111. Bennett & Livingston, supra note 30, at 11.
112. Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer, et al., POL’Y PLAN. STAFF (CAPS) OF THE MINISTRY FOR
EUR. & FOREIGN AFF. & THE INST. FOR STRATEGIC RSCH. (IRSEM) OF THE MINISTRY FOR THE
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coincidentally, is readily evidenced in statements by former president Trump 113
and members of his cabinet, 114 as well as conservative outlets 115 that have
championed the COUR report.
The Commission’s preoccupation with lamenting the proliferation of soft
law norms also flouts the nine duly entered into force and formally binding
treaties that have built upon the rights and norms originally expressed by the
UDHR. 116 Detaching its assessment from these formally binding legal norms
alienates the U.S. from other established democracies and endangers vulnerable
groups and individuals who might fall outside the narrow black letter of human
rights law as the COUR—or the hostile state—perceives it.
Ultimately, the COUR’s sweeping effort to discard “non-binding
resolutions, declarations, standards, commitments, guiding principles, etc.” as it
heaps praise upon the UDHR—itself originally a non-binding UN General
Assembly resolution—is awkward at best. At worst, however, it manifests an
overt attempt to distort seventy years of tireless effort on the part of the
international community—the United States included—to build consensus
towards codifying a better, more durable, if still imperfect, system of rights
protection for everyone, everywhere. Rather than offer a measured and nuanced
ARMED FORCES, Information Manipulation: A Challenge for Our Democracies, at 37 (Aug. 2018),
https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/information_manipulation_rvb_cle838736.pdf.
113. At one rally in Louisiana, president Trump incoherently cut into the “elites”: “You know
they call them the elite? We’re the elite. We’re the elite. I know this, speaking for myself, I went
to better schools than they did, I have nicer houses than they do. I have nicer apartments. I have
nicer everything. And they’re elite. But we’re not elite? You people work your asses off. You’re
making a lot of money.” James Walker, Donald Trump Blasts Elites at Louisiana Rally, Boasts He
Has ‘Nicer Houses’ Than They Do, NEWSWEEK (Nov. 7, 2019), https://www.newsweek.com
/donald-trump-elites-nicer-houses-louisiana-rally-1470298.
114. For example, Trump’s Attorney General, William Barr referred to the International
Criminal Court as “little more than a political tool employed by unaccountable international elites.”
Julian Borger, Trump Targets ICC with Sanctions After Court Opens War Crimes Investigation,
GUARDIAN (June 11, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/jun/11/trump-icc-us-war
-crimes-investigation-sanctions. On his way out of office, Secretary Pompeo similarly lashed out
at critics, branding them “elites” and “globalists.” Julian Borger, Mike Pompeo Declares China’s
Treatment of Uighurs ‘Genocide’, GUARDIAN (Jan. 19, 2021), https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2021/jan/19/mike-pompeo-china-uighur-genocide-sanctions-xinjiang.
115. See, e.g., a Heritage Foundation report asserting that “[e]lites have ignored the concerns
of U.N. member states and are trying to manufacture and impose new sexual orientation and gender
identity (“SOGI”) rights. Creating new rights based on membership in special identity groups
corrodes the principles of equality and universality.” Emilie Kao & Grace Melton, The U.S. Must
Protect Human Rights of All Individuals Based on Human Dignity—Not on Membership in Identity
Groups, HERITAGE FOUND., May 24, 2018, at 1, BACKGROUNDER, No. 3321. Writing elsewhere,
Kao lauded the COUR’s final report. See Kao, supra note 98 (claiming the COUR report provided
“much-needed clarity to a domestic and global conversation that has become muddled and
politicized.”).
116. U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS., THE CORE INT’L HUM. RTS. TREATIES, at 1, U.N.
Doc. ST/HR/3/Rev. 1, U.N. Sales No. E.14.XIV.1 (2014).
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critique of legitimate flaws with the contemporary human rights system, the
COUR charts a path favoring the wholesale discrediting of international human
rights institutions and a dangerous retrograde static framing of human rights
norms that throws the baby out with the bathwater.
Finally, in its effort to narrow the possibility of “new” human rights, the
Commission promotes a flawed emphasis on sovereignty and an underdeveloped
baseline for human rights compliance that is at odds with the principle of
universality. Four of the COUR’s twelve formal conclusions work to undercut
universality by enlarging allowances for non-uniformity and national traditions,
in turn encouraging a prioritization of sovereignty that abets relativism. For
example, the report concludes that states must be permitted their “independence
and sovereignty . . . to make their own moral and political decisions that affirm
universal human rights within the limits” provided by the UDHR. 117 This
formulation is troubling in three key respects.
First, in making this claim, the COUR imposes an originalist reading on the
UDHR. Doing so belies the document’s open-ended drafting, its evolutive
history over seventy years, 118 and the overarching obligation to interpret human
rights texts to ensure their contemporary and practical effect. 119 This approach
unnecessarily impedes the scope of potentially protected rights. Exacerbating
this, the COUR erroneously holds out the UDHR’s provision on rights
limitations as the international gold standard. This view neglects the legally
binding standards established under the core human rights treaties, including the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), that enshrine
limitations clauses that are decidedly more specific and narrowly tailored than
the UDHR. 120

117. REPORT OF THE COUR, supra note 96, at 57.
118. U.N., THE FOUNDATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, https://www.un.org/
en/about-us/udhr/foundation-of-international-human-rights-law (last visited Oct. 17, 2021).
119. Loizidou v. Turkey (Preliminary Objections), App. 15318/89, ¶ 72 (Mar. 23, 1995),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57920.
120. Secretary Pompeo might be dismayed to learn that the UDHR would authorize sweeping
limits on the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion “for the purpose of securing due
recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements
of morality, public order and the general welfare.” UDHR, supra note 88, art. 29. In contrast, the
legally binding ICCPR “does not permit any limitations whatsoever on the freedom of thought and
conscience or on the freedom to have or adopt a religion or belief of one’s choice. These freedoms
are protected unconditionally.” U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment 22, at art. 18 ¶¶ 3, 8,
Freedom of Thought, Conscience or Religion, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev. 1/Add. 4 (1993). Only
one part of this broad right is subject to limit—the freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs—
and then, only where “necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental
rights and freedoms of others.” Id.; U.N. Int’l Hum. Rts. Instruments, at 35–37, Compilation of
General Comments & General Recommendations Adopted By Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N.
Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev. 1 (1994).
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Freezing human rights as they were in 1948 and endorsing a sweeping
limitations clause to restrict those rights derides the international system’s
progress over the last seventy years. But perhaps most alarmingly, the COUR
report’s untethered approach furnishes authoritarian states with new fodder to
reenergize their worn invocations of sovereignty and non-interference as a
means of avoiding accountability for their own rights violations. By validating
state sovereignty as a shield against international scrutiny of human rights norms
disparaged as new or out of line with national traditions, the COUR clouds
longstanding recognition that human rights are justifiably a matter of
international concern. 121 This in turn lends credence to those who cleave to the
false notion that any critique of domestic human rights abuses is tantamount to
interference in internal affairs and violates state sovereignty. 122
As the next section demonstrates, the misinformation and disinformation
contained in the COUR report and disseminated by U.S. officials and others
damages common political knowledge concerning the source, nature, and
function of international human rights. In so doing, the report destabilizes
international institutions and weakens the community of democratic states that
are waging a genuine struggle against illiberal and authoritarian forces seeking
to undermine the substance of contemporary human rights and the effectiveness
of international human rights mechanisms. From this perspective, the COUR
report feeds into the Trump administration’s penchant for illiberalism and
provides a dangerous new tool for authoritarian actors seeking to validate their
own repressive policies. 123

121. OSCE Off. for Democratic Inst. & Hum. Rts. (ODIHR), OSCE Human Dimension
Commitments: Thematic Compilation Vol. 1, at XXVII (3d ed., 2005) (“OSCE participating States
are no longer in a position to invoke the non-intervention principle to avoid discussions about
human rights problems within their countries. This explains why the OSCE is not only a community
of values but also a community of responsibility. And it has to be stressed that this responsibility
focuses not only on the right to criticize other States in relations to violations of human dimension
commitments but also on the duty to assist each other in solving specific problems.”).
122. See, e.g., Robert C. Blitt, The Organization of Islamic Cooperation’s (OIC) Response to
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Rights: A Challenge to Equality and Nondiscrimination
Under International Law, 28 U. IOWA TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. J. 89, 102–11 (2018)
(discussing and comparing various OIC resolutions with non-interference provisions of the
Bangkok Declaration, issued by representatives of Asian states in the leadup to the 1993 World
Conference on Human Rights); Report by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian
Federation, Human Rights Situation in Certain Countries (Moscow 2021), https://www.mid.ru/en/
web/guest/foreign_policy/humanitarian_cooperation/-/asset_publisher/bB3NYd16mBFC/content/
id/4025481 (noting “[T]he issue of human rights is still used by some countries . . . as a pretext for
interference in internal affairs of independent states in violation of their sovereignty.”) (unofficial
unedited translation released by Ministry of Foreign Affairs on file with the author).
123. The Cost of Trump’s Foreign Policy (2020), supra note 53, at 50 (noting autocratic
governments have emulated Trump’s illiberal attacks on freedom of the press and the rule of law).
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III. PERPETUATING DISINFORMATION: PEDDLING THE COUR REPORT
From the moment of its release, the COUR report provided fodder for human
rights disinformation. Secretary Pompeo praised the report’s emphasis on the
primacy of property rights and religious liberty. 124 He further expressed an
eagerness to restrict U.S. support to only “foundational, unalienable rights” at
the expense of what the COUR report branded social and political controversies
dressed up as rights violations. 125 As discussed below, Secretary Pompeo’s
advocacy—particularly his selective framing of the source for human rights and
the nature of the American rights tradition—effectively generated an additional
layer of disinformation by blatantly discarding certain other key findings
acknowledged in the COUR report. 126
For her part in perpetuating the COUR’s human rights misinformation,
Mary Ann Glendon, the Commission’s chair, cautioned that permitting a
“rapidly expanding catalog of rights…not only multiplies the occasion for risks
of collision, but risks trivializing core American values.” 127 This warning openly
contradicted the deliberate seventy-year march towards enlarging the
international community’s understanding of human rights and building out
protections for children, women, migrants, and persons with disabilities, among
others. Moreover, it wrongly depicted the U.S.’s own core values as stagnant, in
turn diminishing our collective capacity to repurpose them and render them
relevant to contemporary needs and challenges. Indeed, the same flawed
rationale underlying Glendon’s advocacy of rights retrenchment is mirrored in
the retrograde arguments proffered in the wake of Abraham Lincoln’s 1863
Emancipation Proclamation that preserved for over seventy years the defective
notion that separate but equal would suffice for achieving racial equality under
the U.S. Constitution.
These and similar glosses on the COUR report, reflecting further varying
degrees of information manipulation, came to be repeated by U.S. government

124. Michael R. Pompeo, U.S. Sec’y of State, Speech at the National Constitution Center:
Unalienable Rights and the Securing of Freedom (July 16, 2020) (transcript available at https://2017
-2021.state.gov/unalienable-rights-and-the-securing-of-freedom/index.html) [hereinafter Pompeo
Speech at National Constitution Center (July 2020)].
125. Id.
126. REPORT OF THE COUR, supra note 96, at 29. See discussion in Part IV below and infra
note 223.
127. Pompeo Speech at National Constitution Center (July 2020), supra note 124.
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officials at the United Nations, 128 with foreign government 129 and civil society
interlocutors, 130 and even incorporated into U.S. policy in the waning days of
the Trump administration. Moreover, as demonstrated below, each of these
subsequent interactions underscored how the COUR’s disinformation
functioned to detach the United States from the community of democratic states
and from international human rights law, and instead invite a rapprochement
with illiberal and authoritarian actors.
A.

COUR Advocacy at the United Nations

To explore this phenomenon in greater depth, consider a virtual event at the
United Nations hosted by the United States on the heels of release of the COUR
report. At this meeting, Secretary Pompeo expressed hope the COUR report
would “serve as an inspiration to other nations and peoples. They should turn to
their traditions and rededicate themselves to their moral, philosophical, and
religious resources to affirm the rights inherent in all persons—the rights at the
core of the UDHR.” 131 In making this statement, the Secretary of State at least
tacitly encouraged states to set aside any binding treaty obligations they might
have in favor of the COUR’s faulty portrayal of a narrow set of rights frozen in
1948 and detached from seventy years of international evolution. This deeply
problematic disinformation was not lost on western diplomats. Many
democracies declined to participate in the event, with the European Union urging
its member states to stay away. 132 According to one diplomat, the U.S. approach

128. Carol Morello, Pompeo Urges Other Countries to Join Alternative U.S. View on Human
Rights, WASH. POST (Sept. 23, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/pompeo
-human-rights-un/2020/09/23/f34a4d2c-fdc2-11ea-830c-a160b331ca62_story.html (explaining
that the event featured “a roundtable with [Mary Ann] Glendon, an Indonesian Muslim scholar and
a Chinese human rights advocate who spoke on the principles rooted in Confucian philosophy”)
[hereinafter Morello (Sept. 2020)].
129. Michael R. Pompeo, U.S. Sec’y of State, Speech at Wallenstein Palace (Czech Republic):
Securing Freedom in the Heart of Europe (Aug. 12, 2020) (transcript available at https://it.usem
bassy.gov/securing-freedom-in-the-heart-of-europe/).
130. Michael R. Pompeo, U.S. Sec’y of State, Speech at Nahdlatul Ulama & Gerakan Pemuda
Ansor Event: Remarks by Secretary Pompeo on Unalienable Rights and Traditions of Tolerance
(Oct. 29, 2020) (transcript available at https://id.usembassy.gov/remarks-by-secretary-pompeo-onunalienable-rights-and-traditions-of-tolerance/) (observing “the most fundamental of these rights is
the right to freedom of conscience, including religious freedom” and “our people have the same
yearning for God-given unalienable rights as people everywhere do”) [hereinafter Pompeo
Remarks (Oct. 2020)].
131. Michael R. Pompeo, U.S. Sec’y of State, Video Remarks on Promoting and Protecting
Human Rights: A Re-Dedication to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Sept. 23, 2020)
(transcript available at https://2017-2021.state.gov/promoting-and-protecting-human-rights-a-rededication-to-the-universal-declaration-of-human-rights/index.html).
132. Morello (Sept. 2020), supra note 128.
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favored “cherry picking” some rights and “few [western diplomats] were
interested in attending.” 133
In another revealing UN meeting during the 2020 Universal Periodic
Review for the United States, the U.S. permanent representative boasted, “at
home and abroad, we continue to advocate for the universal freedoms of religion,
speech, including for members of the press; and for the rights of individuals to
peaceably assemble, and to petition their government for a redress of
grievances.” 134 But a quick review of the examples proffered by the ambassador
to demonstrate the U.S. commitment to protecting this ostensibly varied set of
human rights betrayed the Trump administration’s penchant for human rights
misinformation, and instead reflected a singular preoccupation with religion and
“traditional” family values:
• A memorandum on religious liberty protections in U.S. federal law that
guides all federal executive departments;
• An International Religious Freedom Alliance, joining twenty-five other
member states in advancing freedom of religion or belief around the world;
• Signing the Geneva Consensus Declaration in support of defending life and
protecting the family, with thirty-two other countries; and
• The first of its kind Commission on Unalienable Rights. 135

B.

Building Foreign Support for the COUR: Nahdlatul Ulama & the Centrist
Democrat International

In the context of dissemination of the COUR report abroad, a gathering
sponsored by Nahdlatul Ulama (“NU”) (Revival of the Ulama)/Gerakan
Pemuda Ansor, 136 Indonesia’s largest Muslim organization, bears consideration.
Secretary Pompeo’s remarks at this event drew heavily on the COUR report,
asserting that of the “God-given rights,” the most fundamental “is the right to
freedom of conscience, including religious freedom. It’s the basis for the most
important conversations about what conscience tells us and about what God
demands of each of us.” 137
From this theologically-constrained human rights foundation, Secretary
Pompeo insisted on the need to actively “uphold[] our traditions,” and saluted
NU and its sister organization as “powerful forces in the defense of unalienable
133. Id.
134. Statement by Ambassador Andrew Bremberg, Permanent Representative of the U.S. to the
U.N. in Geneva, Third Cycle Universal Periodic Review of the United States, U.S. Mission Geneva
(Nov. 9, 2020), (transcript available at https://geneva.usmission.gov/2020/11/09/upr-of-the-unitedstates-statement-by-ambassador-andrew-bremberg/)
135. Id. The Geneva Consensus Declaration is discussed in greater detail below.
136. Affiliations, BAYT AR-RAHMAH, https://baytarrahmah.org/affiliations/ (last visited Sept.
9, 2021).
137. Pompeo Remarks (Oct. 2020), supra note 130.
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rights.” 138 Next, Secretary Pompeo discarded seventy years of human rights
development—including binding treaty-based norms and obligations—to urge a
world where international institutions should be limited to protecting
unalienable rights alone. 139 Finally, Secretary Pompeo, with COUR chair
Glendon in tow, used the visit to Jakarta to draw a direct connection between the
COUR report and U.S. co-sponsorship of the newly signed Geneva Consensus
Declaration (“GCD”) on Promoting Women’s Health and Strengthening the
Family. 140
The GCD breaks with international norms on sexual and reproductive
health, 141 and instead promotes the “inherent right to life” of the unborn while
foreclosing any allowance for abortion in the context of family planning. 142 But
for Secretary Pompeo, this declaration:
[S]imply acknowledges what we’ve been speaking about, this set of
[unalienable] rights. And it protects the unborn. We’ve seen this even in
international organizations where they’re actively hostile to some of the basic
human rights that we’ve been speaking about here today. . . . [T]his Geneva
Consensus . . . simply was a declaration of the very ideas that . . . our
Unalienable Rights Commission spoke to, and the way that the international
community must join hands to assist people in demanding that their governments
respect this set of rights. . . . [W]e will never walk away from these fundamental
protections for humanity and for human dignity. 143

With the link between the COUR and GCD established, Secretary Pompeo
made plain that the COUR’s relegation of any right to abortion as a “social and
political controversy” effectively translated life for the unborn into an
unalienable right. As the Secretary summarized later: “The right to life is the
first right, and without it, the other rights are meaningless.” 144
From Secretary Pompeo and the COUR’s perspective, therefore, the journey
to Indonesia was a remarkable success. NU’s general secretary wrote that
Indonesian society “has a natural predisposition to agree with the approach you
advocate for positioning unalienable rights at the heart of a rules-based
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. G.A. Res 70/1 (Oct. 21, 2015) [AKA: Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for
Sustainable Development]. Goal 3 is entitled, “Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all
at all ages,” and target 3.7 states that “[b]y 2030, ensure universal access to sexual and reproductive
health-care services, including for family planning, information and education, and the integration
of reproductive health into national strategies and programmes.” Id. at 16.
142. Permanent Rep. of U.S. to the UN, Letter dated Dec. 2, 2020 from the Permanent Rep. of
the U.S. to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/75/626 (Dec. 7, 2020) [hereinafter Geneva
Consensus Declaration].
143. Pompeo Remarks (Oct. 2020), supra note 130.
144. Mike Pompeo (@mikepompeo), TWITTER (June 5, 2021, 4:15 PM), https://twitter.com/
mikepompeo/status/1401286465548603392.
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international order. . . . That is why we have unreservedly embraced the Report
of the Commission on Unalienable Rights.” 145 For her part, Chair Glendon
lauded the interaction as “vindica[tion]” for the COUR report and “an inspiring
example of the exciting opportunities for which the commission’s work has laid
the foundations.” 146
But as elaborated above, even an “unreserved” embrace of unalienable
rights remains deeply flawed because it refutes the painstaking elaboration of
the contemporary international human rights regime. Moreover, in this case,
such a retrenchment potentially undermines the government of Indonesia’s
compliance with duly ratified human rights treaties. 147
Beyond these concerns, the COUR’s boasting of NU as a human rights
partner raises additional difficulties. NU’s goals of promoting humanitarian
Islam 148 and curbing radicalism, extremism, and terrorism 149 are certainly
laudable. But NU’s rejection of Islamic State-type theocracy alone does not
convert the organization into a beacon for human rights broadly understood.
Although “NU’s self-perception as the defender of pluralism has been echoed
[in] much of the domestic and international academic discourse,” 150 the reality
is more complex—and indeed less aligned with the image of an organization
sincerely committed to promoting and protecting human rights for everyone. For
example, a recent study suggests that pluralism and tolerance do not represent
“deeply embedded norms” for NU, but rather function as “merely rhetorical
instruments” to defend the organization’s political interests and power. 151 This
finding is corroborated by polling data indicating that NU supporters
demonstrate religious and ethnic intolerance at rates “as high and pronounced as
in the rest of the Indonesian Muslim community.” 152 As the authors of the study
conclude, these findings “should come as a sobering reminder to NU, as well as
to those who have viewed it as a key promoter of tolerance and democracy in
Indonesia. . . . [that] its campaigns have done little to ameliorate the levels of
intolerance per se.” 153
145. Berkowitz & Glendon (Jan. 2021), supra note 98.
146. Id.
147. Indonesia has ratified ten of the UN’s eighteen human rights treaties. See U.N. HUM. RTS.
OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R, RATIFICATION OF 18 INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES,
https://indicators.ohchr.org (last visited Oct. 17, 2021).
148. NUSANTARA STATEMENT, BAYT AR-RAHMAH (Oct. 25, 2018), https://www.baytarrah
mah.org/media/2018/Nusantara-Statement.pdf.
149. Krithika Varagur, World’s Largest Islamic Organization Tells ISIS To Get Lost,
HUFFPOST (Dec. 2, 2015) https://www.huffpost.com/entry/indonesian-muslims-counter-isis_n_56
5c737ae4b072e9d1c26bda.
150. Marcus Mietzner & Burhanuddin Muhtadi, The Myth of Pluralism, 42 CONTEMP. SE. ASIA
58, 60, 61 (2020).
151. Id. at 61, 62.
152. Id. at 61, 74.
153. Id. at 61, 78.
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NU’s checkered past, 154 coupled with more contemporary events, throw into
sharper relief the organization’s tenuous embrace of tolerance as well as its
suspect commitment to human rights beyond those grounded in tradition as
elaborated by the COUR. For example, recent investigations indicate NU’s
grassroots clerics and followers have readily cast aside the theology of tolerance
and pluralism promoted by senior leadership, and instead have instigated violent
attacks against Indonesia’s Ahmadi and Shiite religious minorities. 155 This
assessment is rendered even more damning when one considers that the
organization’s impressive 60 million adherents are not readily controlled by
NU’s national leadership, but in actuality follow guidance from these local
clerics (“kiais”), “who voluntarily affiliated themselves and their [Islamic
boarding schools] with the NU.” 156 The U.S. State Department has confirmed
the destabilizing effect of NU’s decentralized organizational structure. In a 2006
cable, embassy officials identified “deeper fissures” in NU’s leadership
stemming from, among other factors, an “increasing influence of conservative
blocs” within NU resulting from “more Wahhabist, radical teachings [] pulling
students away from traditional learning from senior kiai” and the “increasing
influence of hardliners over senior kiai.” 157
COUR commissioners also pointed to the Centrist Democrat International
(“CDI” or “IDC-CDI”) as evidencing further global support for its prioritization

154. In the lead up to the Indonesian military’s violent overthrow of President Sukarno, NU
played a pivotal role in facilitating the campaign of annihilation against the PKI, Indonesia’s
Communist Party, and its affiliated organizations. U.S. Embassy Tracked Indonesia Mass Murder
1965, in NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE, BRIEFING BOOK 607 (Brad Simpson, ed., 2017),
https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/indonesia/2017-10-17/indonesia-mass-murder-1965-usembassy-files. Among other things, NU’s leadership endorsed the killing of individuals who
“consciously joined PKI,” provided the “bulk of support” for paramilitary operations to “root out”
PKI elements, and used the chaos surrounding its “brutal attacks” to target “non-PKI victims
involved in personal feuds with Ansor members [NU’s youth wing].” Telegram 184A from the
American Consulate, Medan, to the American Embassy, Jakarta (Dec. 6, 1965) (on file with the
National Security Archive); Telegram A-386 from American Embassy, Jakarta to Secretary of State
on the PKI Hunt in Central Java (Dec. 10, 1965) (on file with the National Security Archive).
155. Alexander R. Arifianto, Practicing What it Preaches? Understanding the Contradictions
Between Pluralist Theology and Religious Intolerance within Indonesia’s Nahdlatul Ulama, 55
̄ I’AH: J. ISLAMIC STUD. 241, 244 (2017). Arifianto suggests this inconsistency is due to NU
AL-JAM
leaving “ultimate theological authority with local clerics who run their own Islamic boarding
(pesantren) schools and issue their own theological interpretations and rulings (fatwa) to be obeyed
by their students and followers.” Id. at 244–45.
156. Id. at 259.
157. Memorandum from Am. Embassy, Jakarta, on Central and East Java: Increasing
Conservatism Concerns Local Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) Leadership (Nov. 26, 2006, 10:09 AM) (on
file with the Public Library of U.S. Diplomacy).
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of unalienable rights. 158 CDI describes itself as an international political group
dedicated to promoting democracy and development, “whose thinking and
behaviour are based on Christian values and principles of integral humanism
open to transcendence and united in brotherhood.” 159 In an October 2020
resolution on “promoting solidarity and respect among the diverse people,
cultures and nations of the world,” CDI went out of its way to name-drop the
COUR report, calling it a “re-affirmation of the spirit and substance of
fundamental human rights . . . .” 160
Chair Glendon described CDI’s decision to acknowledge the COUR report
as “a particularly gratifying development,” and added that CDI’s president
separately wrote to the COUR to communicate that CDI “unreservedly
embrace[d the] report.” 161 However much gratification the COUR might attach
to the CDI’s embrace, its dubious validation is no more than a rubber stamp from
global purveyors of misinformation already hostile to human rights. CDI’s
executive committee boasts Trump-allied human rights antagonists including
Prime Minister Viktor Orbán of Hungary and Prime Minister Janez Janša of
Slovenia. In one damning report, the Council of Europe (“CoE”) accused the
Orbán government of failing to comply with human rights obligations governing
“the reception of asylum seekers and the integration of recognised refugees;”
“stigmati[zing] and criminali[zing]” legitimate civil society activities; and
“backsliding in gender equality and women’s rights.” 162 Exacerbating this
conduct, Orbán has refused to condemn instances of anti-Semitism in

158. Formerly the Christian Democrat International, the name change came about in 1999 due
to the increasing membership of non-Christian political parties. See History, IDC-CDI,
https://www.idc-cdi.com/history/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2021).
159. IDC-CDI, Statue of the Organization, Doc. 16147 (Oct. 1, 2020), https://www.idc-cdi
.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Legal-English.pdf.
160. IDC-CDI, Resolution on Promoting Solidarity and Respect Among the Diverse People,
Cultures and Nations of the World, Executive Video Conference 1/10/2020 (Oct. 1, 2020),
https://www.idc-cdi.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Resolution-on-promoting-solidarity.pdf.
161. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, SECRETARY MICHAEL R. POMPEO WITH NINO SCALIA OF
MADISON’S NOTES PODCAST (2020), https://2017-2021.state.gov/secretary-michael-r-pompeowith-nino-scalia-of-madisons-notes-podcast/index.html.
162. Dunja Mijatović, Comm’r for Hum. Rts., Council of Eur., Report Following Her Visit To
Hungary From 4 To 8 February 2019 (CommDH(2019)13, 2019), https://rm.coe.int/report-on-thevisit-to-hungary-from-4-to-8-february-2019-by-dunja-mija/1680942f0d. A year earlier, the UN
High Commissioner for Human Rights refused to walk back his conclusion that Orbán was a racist:
“It is time to stand up to the bullies of Mr Orbán’s ilk. So yes, I did call the increasingly
authoritarian—though democratically elected—viktor Orbán a racist and xenophobe.” Tom Miles,
U.N. Human Rights Chief Calls Hungarian PM Orban a Racist, REUTERS, Mar. 6, 2018,
https://news. yahoo.com/u-n-human-rights-chief-calls-hungarian-pm-165243153.html.
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Hungary 163 and has harnessed misinformation and disinformation 164 to, among
other things, “attack women in politics, aggressively challenge feminism, and
attack liberal values.” 165
For his part, Janša has been dubbed “Marshal Tweeto,” “mini-Trump,” 166
and “one of Europe’s most illiberal political figures.” 167 These monikers are an
outgrowth of Janša’s penchant for spreading disinformation 168 and rejecting the
application of international and regional norms intended to secure fundamental
rights including the protection of migrants and media freedom. In response to a
CoE memorandum criticizing the deterioration of freedom of expression and
media freedom in Slovenia, Janša tweeted that the CoE Commissioner for
Human Rights was part of a “#fakenews network.” 169
Orbán and Janša stand at the forefront of an assembly of illiberal-trending
states seeking “to redefine norms and renegotiate the boundaries of acceptable
behavior,” and they embody what Freedom House has labeled “the anti-

163. Ira Forman, Viktor Orbán Is Exploiting Anti-Semitism, ATLANTIC, Dec. 14, 2018,
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/12/viktor-orban-and-anti-semitic-figyelo-cover/
578158/.
164. Patrik Szicherle & Péter Krekó, Commentary, Disinformation in Hungary: From
Fabricated News to Discriminatory Legislation, HEINRICH-BÖLL-STIFTUNG (2021), https://eu.
boell.org/en/2021/06/07/disinformation-hungary-fabricated-news-discriminatory-legislation
(noting the Orbán government has “set up a Russia-like model of media centralisation, leading to
the manipulation of the population through centrally-controlled disinformation and a media empire
following political orders.”).
165. Lucina Di Meco & Kristina Wilfore, Gendered Disinformation is a National Security
Problem, BROOKINGS INSTIT. (Mar. 8, 2021), https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/gendered-dis
information-is-a-national-security-problem/.
166. Stephan Ozsvath, Prime Minister Janez Jansa, Slovenia’s Marshal Tweeto and the Media,
DEUTSCHE WELLE (Mar. 4, 2021), https://www.dw.com/en/prime-minister-janez-jansa-sloveniasmarshal-tweeto-and-the-media/a-56764735.
167. Amanda Coakley, In Slovenia, a Trumpian Populist Assumes a Key European Post,
FOREIGN POL’Y (June 30, 2021), https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/06/30/slovenia-janez-jansatrumpian-populist-illiberal-european-council-presidency/.
168. In one celebratory tweet, Janša wrote: “It’s pretty clear that American people have elected
@realDonaldTrump @Mike_Pence for #4moreyears. More delays and facts denying from #MSM,
bigger the final triumph for #POTUS. Congratulations @GOP for strong results across the #US.”
@JJansaSDS, TWITTER (Nov. 4, 2020, 3:02 AM), https://twitter.com/jjansasds/status/1323913419
200864256?lang=en.
169. Slovenia n˚ 110/2021 Alert: Prime Minister Janša Attempts to Discredit Commissioner for
Human Rights Dunja Mijatovic’s Report on Media Freedom in Slovenia, COUNCIL OF EUROPE
(June 11, 2021), https://www.coe.int/en/web/media-freedom/detail-alert?p_p_id=sojdashboard_
WAR_coesojportlet&p_p_lifecycle=0&p_p_col_id=column-4&p_p_col_pos=2&p_p_col_count=
3&_sojdashboard_WAR_coesojportlet_alertId=101263588. The CoE memorandum at issue called
on Slovenian authorities “to put a stop to the marked deterioration of freedom of expression and of
the media in the country.” Comm’r for Hum. Rts., Council of Eur., Memorandum on Freedom of
Expression and Media Freedom in Slovenia (CommDH(2021)17, 2021), https://rm.coe.int/memo
randum-on-freedom-of-expression-and-media-freedom-in-slovenia/1680a2ae85.
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democratic turn.” 170 These actors have become so untethered that President
Joseph Biden excluded Hungary from his 2021 virtual “Summit for
Democracy.” 171 As for Slovenia, it most recently confirmed its relegation to the
EU’s “rogue club” by opting to confront that organization’s “serious concern”
over rule of law issues in the country with a peculiar combination of diplomatic
snubs and hate-speech. 172 The fact that these leaders—driven as they are by a
proclivity for misinformation and rejection of international human rights
norms—have blessed the COUR exposes how antithetical its findings are to
liberal democratic governance and the UDHR’s foundational promise of
freedom and equality for all. Yet despite the deeply problematic nature of this
endorsement, as well as NU’s, the COUR’s supporters continue to invoke both
instances as validation for the Commission’s work well into the Biden
administration. 173
C. COUR Disinformation Informs U.S. Policy . . . And Attracts Authoritarian
States
In addition to manifesting itself in public statements and international
diplomatic engagement, the COUR’s distorted approach to human rights also
began to insert itself in policy in the waning days of the Trump administration.
For example, the United States Agency for International Development
(“USAID”) published a draft Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment
Policy, which defined “Gender Equality” as “[t]he state in which women, girls,
men, and boys have equal access to opportunities, resources, benefits, and legal
protections and which recognizes their equal inherent human dignity, worth, and
unalienable rights.” 174 Besides expressly incorporating the language of
“unalienable” rights, the draft policy also erased all preexisting references to
“sexual orientation” and transgenderism contained in the same policy from
170. Freedom House, NATIONS IN TRANSIT 2021: THE ANTIDEMOCRATIC TURN, 1–2,
https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2021-04/NIT_2021_final_042321.pdf.
171. Lili Bayer, Biden Sees if a Snub will get Orbán’s Attention, POLITICO (Dec. 9, 2021),
https://www.politico.eu/article/joe-biden-viktor-orban-hungary-democracy-summit-snub/. The
virtual event hosted by the U.S. president gathered “leaders from government, civil society, and the
private sector to set forth an affirmative agenda for democratic renewal and to tackle the greatest
threats faced by democracies today through collective action.” U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, THE SUMMIT
FOR DEMOCRACY (2021), https://www.state.gov/summit-for-democracy/.
172. Wester Van Gaal, Snubbed and Hated: How Slovenia’s Janša Treated MEPs, EU
OBSERVER (Oct. 18, 2021), https://euobserver.com/democracy/153244.
173. See, e.g., Daniel Philpott, Commentary, Blinken’s Dissent From the Human Rights
Magisterium, NAT’L CATHOLIC REG. (2021), https://www.ncregister.com/commentaries/blinkens-dissent-from-the-human-rights-magisterium (claiming the “report’s approach has been
vindicated by its global reception . . . secur[ing] the endorsement of the Centrist Democrat
International . . . and of Indonesia’s Nahdlatul Ulama”).
174. U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., DRAFT 2020 GENDER EQUAL. & WOMEN’S
EMPOWERMENT POL’Y 10 (external review Aug. 19, 2020) (emphasis added).
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nearly a decade earlier. 175 This initiative offered a window into the Trump
administration’s intent to harness the COUR report to prop up traditional
“unalienable rights,” while denying protections for contemporary vulnerable
groups as constituting merely “new rights” or a “social and political
controversy.”
A deeper look at the GCD further drives home how the Trump
administration harnessed the COUR’s selective endorsement of rights and
muscular assertion of sovereignty to undercut U.S. human rights policy. As
noted above, Secretary Pompeo relied on the COUR’s emphasis on unalienable
rights to justify the GCD’s full-throttled protection for the right to life of the
unborn. And in transmitting the GCD to the UN Secretary General, the U.S.
delegation emphasized the Declaration’s main objectives, including “to protect
life at all stages; [and] to declare the sovereign right of every nation to make its
own laws protecting life, absent external pressure.” 176 By channeling human
rights disinformation in this manner, the GCD initiative provides a very practical
example of the potential damage wrought by the COUR’s invitation to alienate
the United States from traditional democratic allies and from positions more
closely reflecting international consensus. 177 So glaring a departure from these
norms does the GCD represent, that the UN’s Working Group on discrimination
against women and girls branded it “an example of the harmful mobilization of
States with conservative and anti-women’s rights agendas to undermine the
well-established and globally recognized human rights of women and girls.” 178
The push to secure signatories for the GCD ultimately mustered the buy-in
of only thirty-four states. But a closer look at their precise makeup provides
striking evidence of the COUR’s deleterious impact (see table below). Tellingly,
of the thirty-four GCD states at the end of 2020, 179 nearly half rank as “Not Free”
based on Freedom House’s Global Freedom survey. Another near half fall under
“Partly Free,” leaving only four states—three excluding the United States—as
175. U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., GENDER EQUAL. & FEMALE EMPOWERMENT POL’Y
(2012), https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1870/GenderEqualityPolicy.pdf.
176. Geneva Consensus Declaration, supra note 142.
177. Underscoring this, for example, a larger and more diverse coalition of states has already
further enlarged the substance of the contested UN resolutions at issue, concluding that “sexual and
reproductive health and rights are a cornerstone of [universal health coverage].” Sigrid Kaag,
Minister for Foreign Trade & Dev. Coop., Gov’t of the Neth., Joint Statement on SRHR in UHC
(Sept. 23, 2019), https://www.government.nl/documents/diplomatic-statements/2019/09/23/jointstatement-on-srhr-in-uhc.
178. U.N. Hum. Rts. Council, Report of the Working Group on discrimination against women
and girls on its Forty-Seventh Session, Women’s and girls’ sexual and reproductive health rights
in crisis, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/47/38, at ¶ 49 (2021).
179. In 2021, two additional states signed the GCD, Russia (designated as “Not Free”) and
Guatemala (designated as “Partly Free”). Rebecca Oas, The Significance of the Geneva Consensus
Declaration, C-FAM, Nov. 19, 2021, https://c-fam.org/definitions/the-significance-of-the-genevaconsensus-declaration/.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

36

[Vol. 66:1

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

designated “Free” (even then, these “Free” states rank near the cusp of “Not
Free”). 180
TABLE: GENEVA CONSENSUS DECLARATION SIGNATORY STATES & HUMAN
RIGHTS RANKINGS 181

Bahrain

GLOBAL
FREEDOM
RANKING
(Score of 100 is
best; 0 worst)
Not Free
12

Belarus

Not Free

11

38

Benin
Brazil

Partly Free
Free

65
74

116
98

Burkina Faso
Cameroon

Partly Free
Not Free

54
16

136
148

Congo (Democ. Rep)
Congo (Rep.)
Djibouti

Not Free
Not Free
Not Free

20
20
24

161
149
145

Egypt
Eswatini

Not Free
Not Free

18
19

151
140

Gambia
Georgia
Haiti

Partly Free
Partly Free
Partly Free

46
60
37

126
46
140

Hungary
Indonesia

Partly Free
Partly Free

69
59

49
95

Iraq
Kenya
Kuwait
Libya
Nauru

Not Free
Partly Free
Partly Free
Not Free
Free

29
48
37
9
77

162
98
96
158
n/a

GCD SIGNATORY STATES

WOMEN PEACE &
SECURITY RANKING
(Score of 1 is best;
167 worst)
83

180. FREEDOM HOUSE, COUNTRIES & TERRITORIES: GLOBAL FREEDOM SCORES,
https://freedomhouse.org/countries/freedom-world/scores (last visited Oct. 17, 2021) (data on file
with the author).
181. Geneva Consensus Declaration, supra note 142. States denoted in bold are ranked as
“Free” under Freedom House’s Global Freedom Ranking. States denoted in italics rank in the top
ten worst countries for women’s security. States shaded in grey are members of the UN Group of
Friends of the Family. See infra note 184.
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Niger

GLOBAL
FREEDOM
RANKING
(Score of 100 is
best; 0 worst)
Partly Free
48

Oman
Pakistan
Paraguay

Not Free
Partly Free
Partly Free

23
37
65

n/a
164
68

Free
Not Free

82
7

25
120

Partly Free

71

114

South Sudan
Sudan
Uganda

Not Free
Not Free
Not Free

2
17
34

163
157
109

United Arab Emirates

Not Free

17

44

Free

83

19

Partly Free

52

107

39

112

GCD SIGNATORY STATES

Poland
Saudi Arabia
Senegal

United States of America
Zambia
Average Score for GCD
States:

37

WOMEN PEACE &
SECURITY RANKING
(Score of 1 is best;
167 worst)
155

Reinforcing the dearth of human rights bona fides among the GCD
signatories, consider how these states fare against the Women, Peace, and
Security (“WPS”) Index, which “systematically measures and ranks women’s
well-being worldwide.” 182 Of the 167 countries ranked in 2019, five GCD
signatories make up half of the world’s ten worst countries for women’s wellbeing, and a mere eight of thirty-four secure a spot in the top half of this ranking,
with only one—the United States—placing in the top twenty. 183 Also wellrepresented among the GCD signatories are members of the UN Group of
Friends of the Family, sometimes referred to as the “Axis of Medievals.” 184 This
182. GEO. INST. FOR WOMEN, PEACE & SEC. & PEACE RSCH. INST. OSLO, WOMEN, PEACE &
SEC. INDEX 2019/20 1 (2019), https://giwps.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/WPSIndex-2019-20-Report.pdf.
183. Id. (data on file with the author).
184. The eleven “Friends of the Family” members that signed the GCD are: Belarus, Egypt,
Indonesia, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Uganda. Organisers,
UNITING N. FOR FAM. FRIENDLY WORLD, https://unitingnationsforthefamily.org/background-2
/organisers/ (last visited Dec 21, 2021). This coalition arose under the auspices of Belarus and with
the help of C-Fam, a U.S. based self-described “pro-family” NGO. Group of Friends of the Family
Launched in the UN, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFS. BELR. (Feb. 4, 2015), https://mfa.gov.by/en/
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coalition of two dozen UN member states, supported by several conservative
and religious groups with close ties to the Trump administration, 185 “seeks to
pre-empt any expansion of rights for girls, women, and LGBT people and
weaken international support for the [1995] Beijing Declaration.” 186 The group
pursues this objective by sidelining certain human rights, prioritizing family
rights over individual rights, 187 and appealing to state sovereignty and noninterference, in a manner that mirrors the GCD and the COUR. 188
This snapshot of the GCD’s antagonism towards international human rights,
coupled with the fact that its members fail to represent any meaningful majority
or consensus view on the international stage, 189 raises a glaring question: if the
press/newsmfa/f8ff663d7481c615.html; Julian Borger & Liz Ford, Revealed: The Fringe
Rightwing Group Changing the UN Agenda on Abortion Rights, GUARDIAN (May 16, 2019),
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2019/may/16/cfam-rightwing-white-house-anti
-abortion-un. Elsewhere, C-Fam has fawned over the Russian Orthodox Church’s rejection of a
UNICEF brief calling for the elimination of discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender
identity and criticized a UN human rights report for its “progressive, and aggressive, attempt to
expand the meaning of family in international law and policy to include same-sex relationships.”
Robert C. Blitt, Religious Soft Power in Russian Foreign Policy: Constitutional Change and the
Russian Orthodox Church, BERKLEY CTR. FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFS., May 2021, at
6, https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/publications/religious-soft-power-in-russian-foreign-poli
cy-constitutional-change-and-the-russian-orthodox-church; Blitt, supra note 122, at 133 n.211
(quoting Stefano Gennarini, UN Report: “There is no Definition of the Family,” CTR. FOR FAM. &
HUM. RTS. (Jan. 29, 2016), http://c-fam.org/Friday_fax/un-report-no-definition-family/).
185. Organisers, UNITING N. FOR FAM. FRIENDLY WORLD, https://unitingnationsforthefamily
.org/background-2/organisers/ (last visited Dec 21, 2021). See related discussion concerning Brian
Brown and the National Organization for Marriage, supra, note 76 & 77. Many of these
conservative or religious advocacy groups vocally support the COUR’s approach. See, e.g., Ashley
Traficant, Groups Unite to Support the U.S. Commission on Unalienable Rights, CONCERNED
WOMEN FOR AM. (Aug. 8, 2019), https://concernedwomen.org/groups-unite-to-support-the-u-scommission-on-unalienable-rights-2/; Tony Perkins, Family Research Council Applauds the State
Department’s Formation of a Commission on Unalienable Rights, FAM. RSCH. COUNCIL (July 8,
2019), https://www.frc.org/get.cfm?i=PR19G01.
186. James M. Dorsey, U.S. Secretary of State Pompeo set to Boost Indonesian Religious
Reform Efforts, WION (Oct 25, 2020), https://www.wionews.com/opinions-blogs/us-secretary-ofstate-pompeo-set-to-boost-indonesian-religious-reform-efforts-337856.
187. Members of the “Friends of the Family”, including Indonesia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Qatar,
Russia, and Saudi Arabia pushed a controversial “Protection of the family” resolution at the Human
Rights Council in 2015 that endorsed a restrictive definition of family. C-Fam celebrated this
resolution as a “big win” and “monumental development for the pro-family movement.” See Blitt,
supra note 122, at 130–35, 133 n.211 (quoting Rebecca Oas, Big Win for a Traditional Family at
UN Human Rights Council, CTR. FOR FAM. & HUM. RTS. (July 9, 2015), http://c-fam.org/Friday
_fax/big-win-for-traditional-family-at-un-human-rights-council/.).
188. In invoking sovereignty, the GCD posits “each nation has the sovereign right to implement
programs and activities consistent with their laws and policies.” Geneva Consensus Declaration,
supra note 142.
189. See U.N. Doc. A/HRC/47/38, supra note 178 (showing larger UN coalition opposing
GCD, favoring expansion of women’s SRH rights). Elsewhere, the GCD’s signatories are described
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COUR project truly intended to re-anchor U.S. foreign policy in the UDHR’s
core rights, why is it serving as a springboard for non-free states seeking to
impair women’s well-being and invoke sovereignty to deflect international
human right concerns? Not to be lost in this puzzle, how does one reconcile the
attribution of any merit to the GCD given the COUR’s and Pompeo’s collective
bemoaning of “the widespread proliferation of non-legal standards,” which, of
course, describes the GCD precisely. 190 These questions are rendered even
starker when considered against the Trump administration’s parallel efforts to
wreak further havoc on the cause of women’s rights at the United Nations,
COUR report and GCD in hand.
During the 75th session of the UN General Assembly, the Trump
administration introduced various proposals intending to delete longstanding
language relating to sexual and reproductive healthcare services for women and
girls. A direct line can be traced between this action and the COUR’s emphasis
on a narrow set of unalienable rights, state sovereignty, tradition and culture, as
well as its disparaging assessment of “new rights.” Among others, the U.S.proposed amendments targeted draft resolutions on child, early and forced
marriage, and trafficking in women and girls. During discussions surrounding
the vote on these amendments, the European Union and its member states
expressed deep regret that the United States sought to delete “long-standing
agreed language that struck a fine balance between the different positions,” 191
and further lamented that the move was “very worrying” and undercut good
faith. 192
The list of countries supporting the United States in its campaign to erase
established rights at the UN is telling. So too is the scale of the U.S. defeat (see
table). Based on Freedom House’s Global Freedom score, nearly seventy percent
of the states that voted in favor of the proposed U.S. amendments (19/28) are
designated “Not Free.” 193 From these twenty-eight states, eight voted with the
United States on at least four occasions: Belarus, Cameroon, Libya, Nauru,
Nicaragua, Qatar, Russia, and Sudan. Only one of these states, tiny Nauru

as a “combination of authoritarian governments, governments with very strong religious views on
women’s rights, highly populist governments that are exploiting polarization and cleavages, and
often basic rollback of human rights.” Nathan Paul Southern & Lindsey Kennedy, Trump’s Legacy
Is a Global Alliance Against Women’s Rights, FOREIGN POL’Y (Jan. 20, 2021), https://foreign
policy.com/2021/01/20/trump-anti-abortion-global-alliance-legacy/.
190. REPORT OF THE COUR, supra note 96, at 41.
191. U.N. GAOR, 75th Sess., Third Comm., 8th mtg., at ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/75/SR.8 (Jan.
29, 2021).
192. U.N. GAOR, 75th Sess., Third Comm., 9th mtg., at ¶¶ 33, 36, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/75/SR.9
(Feb. 12, 2021).
193. FREEDOM HOUSE, COUNTRIES & TERRITORIES, supra note 180. Of the remaining nine
states supporting the U.S. amendments, seven are designated “Free” and two “Partly Free.”
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(population 9,770), 194 is considered “Free,” with the remaining seven classified
as “Not Free.”
Refining this dubious list one step further, Libya, Russia, and Sudan—all
“not free” and all GCD signatories 195—claimed the distinction of voting in
lockstep with the United States in all five instances noted below (see table). So
intense was the opposition of these three states to the notion of women’s rights
that they went so far as to withhold support from the final UN resolution
addressing “[i]ntensification of efforts to prevent and eliminate all forms of
violence against women and girls.” That resolution, adopted 170 votes to none,
recorded eleven abstentions: Libya, Russia, and Sudan, together with only eight
other states (including two additional GCD signatories, Belarus, and
Cameroon). 196
UN RESOLUTIONS ON WOMEN AND GIRLS: U.S. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS AND
VOTING OUTCOMES
DRAFT

RESOLUTION

U.S. PROPOSED
AMENDMENT

COUNTRIES

VOTING WITH THE
UNITED STATES

OUTCOME OF VOTE ON
U.S. AMENDMENTS
(AGAINST — IN FAVOR
— ABSTAIN)

A/C.3/75/L.68

Libya, Nauru,
Palau, Qatar,
Russia, Sudan,
Syria, Tonga

120 – 9 – 28 198

Child, early and
forced
marriage 199

A/C.3/75/L.84

Belarus, Cameroon,
Libya, Nauru,
Nicaragua, Qatar,
Russia, Sudan,
Syria, Tonga

121 – 11 – 32 200

Intensification
of efforts to end
obstetric
fistula 201

A/C.3/75/L.86

None

153 – 1 – 11 202

Trafficking in
women and
girls 197

194. Nauru, WORLD FACTBOOK (Dec. 14, 2021), https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/
countries/nauru/.
195. Although not an original signatory, Russia joined the GCD in late 2021. Oas, supra note
179.
196. U.N. Doc. A/C.3/75/SR.9, supra note 192, at ¶ 67.
197. U.N. GAOR, 75th Sess., Third Comm., U.N. Doc. A/C.3/75/L.14 (Oct. 20, 2020).
198. U.N. Doc. A/C.3/75/SR.8, supra note 191, at ¶¶ 11–12.
199. U.N. GAOR, 75th Sess., Third Comm., U.N. Doc. A/C.3/75/L.18/Rev.1 (Nov. 10, 2020).
200. U.N. Doc. A/C.3/75/SR.8, supra note 191, at ¶¶ 75–76.
201. U.N. GAOR, 75th Sess., Third Comm., U.N. Doc. A/C.3/75/L.17 (Oct. 20., 2020).
202. U.N. Doc. A/C.3/75/SR.8, supra note 191, at ¶¶ 123–24.
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DRAFT

RESOLUTION

Intensification
of efforts to
prevent and
eliminate all
forms of
violence against
women and
girls 203

U.S. PROPOSED
AMENDMENT

COUNTRIES

VOTING WITH THE
UNITED STATES

41

OUTCOME OF VOTE ON
U.S. AMENDMENTS
(AGAINST — IN FAVOR
— ABSTAIN)

A/C.3/75/L.69

Algeria, Belarus,
Burundi, Cameroon,
Eritrea, Jamaica,
Libya, Nicaragua,
Qatar, Russia,
Sudan 204

117 – 12 – 28 205

A/C.3/75/L.70

Belarus, Brazil,
Brunei, Cameroon,
Egypt, Iraq, Libya,
Nauru, Nicaragua,
Pakistan, Qatar,
Russia, Sudan,
Tonga, Yemen,
Zimbabwe

113 – 17 – 33 206

A/C.3/75/L.71

Belarus, Brunei,
Cameroon, Egypt,
Eritrea, Iraq,
Jamaica, Laos,
Libya, Malaysia,
Myanmar, Nauru,
Nicaragua, Oman,
Russia, Saint Kitts
and Nevis, Saint
Vincent and the
Grenadines, Sudan,
Yemen

102 – 20 – 38 207

The Trump administration’s reliance on the COUR report to justify these
amendments underscores that document’s real corrosive effect on human rights.
Like a pied piper, U.S. attacks on “new international rights” and assertions of
the “sovereign right to implement . . . activities . . . without any external pressure
or interference” 208 marshalled the world’s most authoritarian and illiberal actors
in a frontal assault on those very rights. Not to be lost in this debacle, the U.S.
delegation without irony also invoked the GCD—itself embodying a “new” soft
law the type of so anathema to the COUR—to affirm the validity of its
203. U.N. GAOR, 75th Sess., Third Comm., U.N. Doc. A/C.3/75/L.19/Rev.1 (Nov. 11, 2020)
204. U.N. Doc. A/C.3/75/SR.9, supra note 192, at ¶ 52.
205. Id. ¶ 53.
206. Id. ¶¶ 54–55.
207. Id. ¶¶ 56–57.
208. See, e.g., U.N. Doc. A/C.3/75/SR.8, supra note 191, at ¶¶ 16, 82, 129, U.N. Doc.
A/C.3/75/SR.9, supra note 192, at ¶ 73.
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position, 209 effectively raising the bar for human rights disinformation under the
Trump administration.
IV. AN END TO HUMAN RIGHTS DISINFORMATION?
With Trump’s failed re-election bid and the inauguration of President Biden
in January 2021, it seemed the effort to further promote and embed the COUR
report through U.S. policy was destined to be cut short. One of President Biden’s
first acts in office directed the Secretary of State to “withdraw co-sponsorship
and signature from the Geneva Consensus Declaration,” 210 with the State
Department subsequently moving to reengage multilaterally “to protect and
promote the human rights of all women and girls, consistent with the longstanding global consensus on gender equality and sexual and reproductive health
and reproductive rights.” 211
Presenting the State Department’s 2020 Human Rights Report, Secretary of
State Anthony J. Blinken enlarged this pushback, taking direct aim at the COUR:
One of the core principles of human rights is that they are universal. All people
are entitled to these rights, no matter where they’re born, what they believe,
whom they love, or any other characteristic. Human rights are also co-equal;
there is no hierarchy that makes some rights more important than others. Past
unbalanced statements that suggest such a hierarchy, including those offered by
a recently disbanded State Department advisory committee [(“the COUR”)], do
not represent a guiding document for this administration. At my confirmation
hearing, I promised that the Biden-Harris administration would repudiate those
unbalanced views. We do so decisively today. 212
209. See, e.g., U.N. Doc. A/C.3/75/SR.8, supra note 191, at ¶¶ 16, 82, 129, U.N. Doc.
A/C.3/75/SR.9, supra note 192, at ¶ 73.
210. WHITE HOUSE, MEMORANDUM ON PROTECTING WOMEN’S HEALTH AT HOME AND
ABROAD (2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/01/28/
memorandum-on-protecting-womens-health-at-home-and-abroad/.
211. Press Statement, Secretary Anthony J. Blinken, U.S. Dep’t of State, Prioritizing Sexual
and Reproductive Health and Reproductive Rights in U.S. Foreign Policy (Jan. 28, 2021) (available
at https://www.state.gov/prioritizing-sexual-and-reproductive-health-and-reproductive-rights-in-u
-s-foreign-policy/). As part of this effort, the State Department’s annual human rights report will
restore expanded subsections on “Discrimination, Societal Abuses, and Trafficking in Persons” to
address a broader range of issues related to sexual and reproductive rights, including “maternal
health issues such as maternal mortality, government policy adversely affecting access to
contraception, access to skilled healthcare during pregnancy and childbirth, access to emergency
healthcare, and discrimination against women in accessing sexual and reproductive health care,
including for sexually transmitted infections.” U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY,
HUM. RTS., & LAB., 2020 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES (Mar. 30, 2021)
(available at https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/).
212. Remarks to the Press, Secretary Anthony J. Blinken, U.S. Dep’t of State, on Release of
the 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Mar. 30, 2021) (available at
https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-on-release-of-the-2020-country-reports-onhuman-rights-practices/).
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This decisive statement, however, may not have been enough to correct the
misinformation and disinformation wrought by the COUR. In response to
Blinken, Commission backers expressed indignation and doubled down on their
intention to defend the report’s relevancy for U.S. policymaking. In the words
of one critic, Blinken “derogatorily dismissed” the commission, “not call[ing it]
by its proper name” and “downplay[ing its] work . . . as mere ‘statements’
without referring to the landmark report.” 213 According to another, Blinken’s
repudiation of the COUR was many different things: “unfair and misleading”
and “lamentable and ironic.” 214 Others still attested that the COUR report
reflected a measured approach that successfully finessed the profound problems
discussed above, leaving them to speculate that Blinken had not bothered to read
the document. 215
Members of the now-defunct COUR likewise rushed to defend their work
and attack the new administration. Peter Berkowitz, holding the Commission
innocent of green-lighting any manipulation of human rights, decried the
diplomatic costs and “partisan division” Blinken’s action would stir. 216 Setting
aside the irony of Berkowitz’s observations, he remained silent about precisely
what cost might be paid by abandoning states like Belarus, Cameroon, Qatar,
Russia, and Sudan, and squarely rejoining the community of liberal
democracies. Former COUR Commissioner Russell Berman’s assessment
similarly downplayed any controversial aspects of the COUR report or
subsequent actions taken by the Trump administration. Instead, he accused
Blinken of being unable to “pass up the opportunity for a snarky dismissal of the
commission.” 217
The stilted assessments proffered by these and other defenders of the COUR
project—rejoinders that entirely disregard the human rights company kept by

213. Stefano Gennarini, Biden Administration Repudiates Unalienable Human Rights, Elevates
Sexual Rights Instead, C-FAM (Apr. 15, 2021), https://c-fam.org/friday_fax/biden-administrationrepudiates-unalienable-human-rights-elevates-sexual-rights-instead/.
214. Philpott, supra note 173. In Philpott’s words, Blinken “missed an opportunity to sustain
the human rights magisterium”—essentially the same distorted set of cherry-picked norms
endorsed by the COUR.
215. Elliott Abrams, Blinken’s Unfair “Repudiation” of the Report on Unalienable Rights,
CFR (Mar. 31, 2021), https://www.cfr.org/blog/blinkens-unfair-repudiation-report-unalienablerights. To build his case that the COUR report was without flaws, Abrams reprints its table of
contents, urging readers to “take a quick look.”
216. Peter Berkowitz, Secretary Blinken Politicizes Human Rights, REALCLEAR POL. (Apr. 9,
2021), https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2021/04/09/secretary_blinken_politicizes_hu
man_rights_145552.html. Berkowitz, now at Stanford’s Hoover Institution, was the COUR’s
executive secretary.
217. Like Berkowitz, Berman is also affiliated with the Hoover Institution. Russell A. Berman,
Human Rights Hypocrisy: Why Blinken Misses the Mark, NAT’L INTEREST, Apr. 3, 2021,
https://nationalinterest.org/feature/human-rights-hypocrisy-why-blinken-misses-mark-181734.
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the Trump administration, focus on God-given rights, 218 and allude to
generalities rather than practical effects—constitute a further amplification of
human rights disinformation. This second layer of disinformation relies on a
distillation of the COUR’s findings to reiterate a religiously-fueled conservative
vision of human rights, centered on prioritizing freedom of religion and
obviating other “new” rights claims that might clash with it. Riding the crest of
this disinformation wave as he contemplates a presidential run in 2024 is former
Secretary Pompeo. 219
In Pompeo’s view, the Biden administration “essentially disowned [the
COUR’s] work, which was glorious work.” 220 Describing the COUR in this
religiously infused manner is no Freudian slip. The prioritization of religious
freedom hardwired into Pompeo’s support of the COUR reinforces an overriding
impression that, above all, the Commission’s purpose sought to secure a
vindication of religious rights in the face of any threat posed by contemporary
“social and political controversies.” To this end, Pompeo has warned, “It’s going
to take every Christian believer and all of us to continue to work hard in our
churches and our towns and indeed, in our missions across the world, to promote
religious freedom everywhere and always.” 221 Elsewhere, he has claimed the
COUR recognized “human beings that were created in the image of God and the
rights that we have as a result of that.” 222 By repeatedly enveloping the COUR
in this theological cloak, Pompeo aspires to a new level of disinformation,
effectively erasing two thirds of the COUR report’s context and content, which
more accurately acknowledges three distinct traditions “that formed the
American spirit” on rights: Protestant Christianity . . . infused with the beautiful
Biblical teachings that every human being is imbued with dignity . . . because

218. Callista L. Gingrich, The Importance of the Commission on Unalienable Rights,
NEWSWEEK (Apr. 9, 2021), https://www.newsweek.com/importance-commission-unalienablerights-opinion-1582556 (positing that “human rights advocates created new categories of rights that
removed the important differentiation between rights granted by governments and unalienable
rights from God” and stressing “It is critical that U.S. foreign policy continue to protect the
unalienable, God-given rights of all human beings in cooperation with our partners and allies.”).
219. Meg Kinnard, Pompeo Unveils PAC, Demurs on Possible 2024 Presidential Bid, ABC
NEWS (June 17, 2021), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory/pompeo-unveils-pac-demurs2024-presidential-bid-78340172.
220. Emily Wood, Biden Admin. has De-prioritized Religious Liberty, ‘Disowned that Work’:
Mike Pompeo, CHRISTIAN POST (Apr. 20, 2021), https://www.christianpost.com/news/bidenadmin-has-de-prioritized-religious-liberty-work-mike-pompeo.html.
221. Id.
222. Texas Public Policy Foundation, Talk with Mike Pompeo: China on the Move & the
Breakdown at the Border, YOUTUBE (Mar. 24, 2021), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=17WU
aaViYu4 (at approximately 25:22).
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each is made in the image of God”; the civic republican ideal; and classical
liberalism. 223
Pompeo has taken this fixation to the extreme, analogizing the perceived
threat presented by “atheists” to the threat presented by literally being
surrounded by Nazis. Alluding to General Anthony McAuliffe’s famous retort
after being confronted by a Nazi demand to surrender in the face of the 101st
Airborne’s during WWII, 224 Pompeo used his 2021 commencement address to
warn Regent University graduates:
The effort to undermine our right to practice our faith is at the very pointy end
of [an] atheistic spear … some on our side believe it’s possible to sue for peace.
just work with them, find a comfortable middle ground. (Laugh, chuckle.) Look,
I consider that a bit of a joke. . . . That compromise will move us from tolerance
to acceptance to approval. My view of our collective response has to be this.
. . . When the world says compromise your values, tell them “Nuts. It’s not
gonna happen.” Never give an inch. Because if you do, the world will take a
foot. And then a mile. And you’ll wake up one day with your religious freedom
gone. 225

These—sometimes even more extreme—amplifications of disinformation
perpetuated through Pompeo and others seeks to repurpose human rights to
uphold an unflagging protection of religious liberty steeped in conservative
traditional values. As noted above, this effort is platformed on the same
retrograde assessment of human rights espoused by the COUR, one that rests on
hierarchical “originalism” and is detached from recent history. Like the COUR,
it similarly discards the promise of human rights for securing equality and
nondiscrimination for everybody and for offering a framework capable of
reconciling competing interests.
Perhaps more troubling and telling amidst this ongoing disinformation
effort, however, is the fact that no commissioners have spoken out publicly
against these overt and ongoing secondary manipulations and distortions of the
COUR report. Likewise, evidence indicates that the COUR report has not been
vanquished to the trash bin of history despite the Biden administration’s efforts.
223. REPORT OF THE COUR, supra note 96, at 8. Indeed, on the question “To what extent do
unalienable rights rest on the work of a creator Deity?”, the COUR itself concluded that “No single
answer to these metaphysical questions was decisive in 1776. Still less today, when the very ideas
of human nature, objective reason, and a creator God have come into disrepute among intellectuals,
while the view that human beings are entirely explainable in terms of the physical properties of
their bodies has grown in popularity.” Id. at 10–11.
224. Gary Sterne, “Nuts!” – The Story Behind the Famous American Reply to the German
Surrender Ultimatum at Bastogne, MIL. HIST. NOW (Sept. 15, 2020), https://militaryhistorynow
.com/2020/09/15/nuts-the-story-of-the-famous-american-reply-to-the-german-surrender-ultima
tum-at-bastogne/.
225. Michael R. Pompeo, Commencement Address to the Class of 2021, REGENT UNIV. (May
8, 2021), https://www.regent.edu/admin/media/live_commencement/?live_event_name=com
mencement (quote starts at approximately 25:00).
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Indeed, a former commissioner’s home university has announced it will serve as
a repository for the COUR report and its accompanying documents. Already,
that university held a conference “to consider ways to carry forward the
commission’s work.” 226 These realities testify to misinformation’s “pernicious”
ability “to continue to influence thinking long after someone initially sees it,”
and underscore why effective refutation is especially challenging. 227
CONCLUSION
This Article has identified misinformation and disinformation contained in
the Commission on Unalienable Rights’ final report and demonstrated how its
approach to human rights has served to untether U.S. policy from the fold of
western democracies and instead engender a cozying up to autocrats and
illiberals. Despite the incoming Biden administration’s fleeting repudiation of
the report, the Article has further called attention to ongoing efforts to distort
existing international human rights norms premised on sustaining the legitimacy
of the COUR’s work, even while adding another layer of misinformation to the
mix. Taken together, this activity challenges the common political knowledge
shared by democratic states, namely that human rights are not static nor
premised on the singular prioritization of freedom of religion at the expense of
other rights. The harm emanating from these concerted efforts is only
compounded by the quotidian attacks directed against the international human
rights system by the more usual authoritarian and illiberal actors that are
similarly couched in the COUR’s prioritization of tradition, sovereignty, and a
narrow framing of rights. Accordingly, a more thorough and comprehensive
response to the report is warranted.
To effectively address the malign effects of the COUR, the administration
should consider additional measures capable of more durably correcting the
impact of disinformation at home, in its bilateral relations, and throughout the
UN’s human rights system and other related bodies. In this vein, the
administration has already taken several steps that implicitly repudiate the
COUR’s approach. For example, it revoked the Mexico City Policy, withdrew
from the Geneva Consensus Declaration, and resumed support for the United
Nations Population Fund as a means of promoting “women’s health and equity
at home and abroad. . . . including sexual and reproductive rights. 228 President
Biden also moved to appoint a new U.S. Special Envoy to Advance the Human
Rights of LGBTQI+ Persons. 229 Most recently, the Biden administration
226. Berkowitz & Glendon, supra note 98.
227. Goldberg, supra note 37.
228. Remarks to the Press, Secretary Anthony J. Blinken, supra note 212.
229. Donald Judd & Kate Sullivan, President Joe Biden Appoints Jessica Stern Special Envoy
for LGBTQ Rights, CNN (June 25, 2021), https://edition.cnn.com/2021/06/25/politics/lgbtq-envoyjessica-stern/index.html.
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rejoined the UN Human Rights Council 230 and announced its intention “to issue
a formal, standing invitation to all UN experts who report and advise on thematic
human rights issues,” 231 as a means of facilitating visits and boosting U.S.
engagement with these mechanisms. 232 As Secretary Blinken rightly pointed out
in making this announcement, “Responsible nations must not shrink from
scrutiny of their human rights record; rather, they should acknowledge it with
the intent to improve.” 233
These are important steps that can be supplemented by further reinvigorating
U.S. leadership and regalvanizing the alliance of democratic states. Efforts at the
United Nations should be coordinated to clearly call out those who hide behind
invocations of tradition and sovereignty to deny the UDHR’s foundational
promise of human rights for everyone everywhere, as well as its grundnorm,
“All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.” 234 From its
seat on the UN Human Rights Council, the United States should work to build
meaningful inroads through vigorous diplomacy and alliance-building.
Engagement, not avoidance, will alleviate at least some of the real hypocrisy
that prevents effective interventions and coalition building with more reticent
states. This advocacy should forcefully and “consistently communicate detailed
information rebutting . . . [retrograde] arguments and concerns, including
highlighting their internal inconsistencies and incompatibilities with
international human rights law,” 235 across all multilateral and bilateral
engagement.
One of the key challenges of confronting misinformation and disinformation
stems from its ability to be perpetuated on an ongoing basis. In this context,
several avenues exist for resisting and responding to disinformation. For
example, Google’s Jigsaw project has observed that an “inoculation” approach
designed to “build up people’s resistance or ‘mental antibodies’ to encountering
230. Editorial, United States Rejoins UN Human Rights Council, VOA, Oct. 29, 2021,
https://editorials.voa.gov/a/united-states-rejoins-un-human-rights-council/6291033.html.
231. Anthony J. Blinken, U.S. Leadership on Human Rights and Ending Systemic Racism (July
13, 2021), https://www.state.gov/u-s-leadership-on-human-rights-and-ending-systemic-racism/.
232. For more on standing invitations, see supra note 51.
233. Blinken, supra note 231. Blinken’s efforts prompted the Republican Study Committee, the
“conservative caucus of House Republicans and a leading influencer on the Right [that seeks to]
preserve traditional values,” to declare: “Your culture-war diplomacy stands in marked contrast to
. . . Mike Pompeo who made the protection of human rights . . . a top priority, especially through
the creation of the non-partisan Commission on Unalienable Rights, which you have denounced.”
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misinformation” could serve to protect people through educating them “to spot
and refute a misleading claim.” 236 RAND echoes this approach by observing that
“the strongest weapon against disinformation is our common sense.” 237 In a
related vein, a recent CoE report concluded that challenging false information
effectively requires replacing it with a powerful alternative narrative that is
repeated, capable of provoking an “emotional response,” and affords a strong
visual aspect. 238
Each of these proposed solutions points to one key factor: education.
Education that is ongoing, dynamic, comprehensive, and accessible. What is
obvious, then, is that a thorough repudiation of the COUR’s disinformation
demands—together with policy actions—a detailed and lasting narrative capable
of authoritatively rebutting its distorted context and findings. In addition,
therefore, the administration should develop resources that provide an
educational bedrock for informing people about the U.S. understanding of and
relationship with international human rights in a manner that is not narrowly
anchored to “unalienable” rights, but rather derived from a fuller, more complex
accounting of our ongoing history and engagement. These resources can help
people resist disinformation and misinformation while providing a more durable
and comprehensive refutation of the COUR’s faulty remit and report.
To be certain, this will be no easy task. Writing over two centuries ago,
Alexis de Toqueville noted that “A proposition must be plain to be adopted by
the understanding of a people. A false notion which is clear and precise will
always meet with a greater number of adherents in the world than a true principle
which is obscure or involved.” 239 Human rights are complicated. The act of
balancing competing or conflicting human rights is especially complex.
Engaging in this substance seems even more daunting when one considers new
challenges, such as recent domestic efforts to strike civil rights education from
public school curriculums. 240 But this inherent difficultly should not dissuade
the administration from thinking in bold new ways about undertaking
educational outreach programs at home and abroad based on fulfilling the
promise of human dignity rather than upholding a narrowly construed or static
idea of what is or is not unalienable.
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